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ABSTRACT 
 
As one of the world’s most unequal societies, Brazil is often referred to as a land of 
contrasts: the causes of its high levels of income inequality continuously debated. 
When solutions are discussed, one of the more frequently recited policy 
prescriptions is to expand the supply of education within the economy. Through 
utilisation of socio-economic profiles of students who subscribed to and were 
enrolled in Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP), one of the more 
progressive public higher education establishments, the data indicates that, 
between1987- 2010, the Brazilian education system could in fact have exacerbated 
inequality, despite society having undertaken national educational expansion. The 
data illustrates how, during the period analysed, less than 35% of UNICAMP 
students attended only public education; and that moreover, while 61% had 
attended entrance examination preparation courses, nearly three quarters of 
participants at these examinations failed to be enrolled at the first time of asking. It 
is also estimated that more than 60% of UNICAMP students are from households 
from the 9th and 10th income decile.  
With the socio-economic profiles of public higher education tending to favour high 
income households, the curative effects of educational expansion on income 
inequality appear to be paradoxical. Therefore, a more qualitative approach to 
public education expansion may be required if a more egalitarian society is to be 
engendered by tuition-free public higher institutions. 
 
                                                          
∗ I appreciate the advice and passion of my supervisor. Tracy Keefe has copy-edited the paper and 
greatly improved the presentation of tables in the appendix.  
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‘There will only be democracy in Brazil the day the machine that 
prepares people for democracy – the public school – is assembled in 
Brazil’ 
 
Anísio Spínola Teixeira1 
 
 
1. Brazil and Inequality 
Around the turn of the century, Brazil became part of the emerging global 
economic powers, labelled the BRICs.2 In 2012, Brazil’s output is predicted to overtake the 
United Kingdom (UK), and become the sixth largest economy on the planet. The growth 
of both Brazil and the BRICs highlight a potential shift in economic and political power 
away from the traditional G7 countries; this change may prove an important bookmark in 
global history.  
However, regardless of Brazil’s impressive recent economic growth, the nation 
continues to wrestle with problems of poverty and inequality. The proportion of the 
population living on less than $1.25 a day (2005 PPP) has shown signs of improvement 
since re-democratisation, falling from 13.64% in 1987 to 6.01% in 2008.3 Moreover, 
despite this reduction in the proportion of its population in poverty, Brazil’s high degree of 
inequality has persisted.4  By employing a Gini coefficient and income concentration 
measurements, Figures 1 & 2 compare income inequality in both the world’s major and 
emerging economies; and in Latin America, from 1987-2006. The data reaffirms that the 
Brazilian economy features comparatively high levels of income inequality. Even today, this 
problem continues to persist.  The highly negative impact of such inequality ranges from 
economic stagnation to high levels of criminal activity.
5
 It would therefore be 
advantageous for Brazil and other economies with similar characteristics to address this 
problem immediately. 
A number of avenues have been identified as methods with which to correct 
income inequalities. Recently, attempts have been made to distribute political power and 
decision-making more equally in the hope that this will help provide opportunities for 
hitherto excluded social groups, and lead to reductions in economic inequality.
6
 
Historically, governments have attempted to address the problem through land 
                                                          
1 Bethell and Nicolau, ‘Politics in Brazil’, p. 272. 
2 O'Neill, Building. 
3 World databank, http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=1&id=4, retrieved 24th 
August, 2012. 
4 A large proportion of poverty reduction occurred post-1994 after the Real Plan which consisted of 
a mixture of inflationary control, liberalisation reforms and an expansion of social assistance 
programs. See Ferreira, Leite, and Ravallion, ‘Poverty reduction’. 
5 Alesina, and Rodrik, ‘Distributive politics’; Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza, ‘Inequality and 
violent’. 
6 In 2012, the Supreme Court of Brazil adopted a policy of racial quotas. 
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redistribution or agricultural reforms; albeit thanks to modernization, land assets are not 
as influential in remedying this as was once the case.
7
  
Through a combination of globalisation and industrialisation, income and wage 
differentials in the late 20th and early 21st centuries became driven increasingly by 
educational attainment. It is estimated that educational differences now account for over 
two thirds of identifiable sources of wage inequality.
8
 Indeed, a body of academic and 
multilateral agency literature preaches the virtues of expanding education in an attempt to 
bridge the gaps created by unequal income distribution.
9
 
Conversely, this study offers an alternative perspective with regard to the role 
played by education in income inequalities, by exploring the role of the Brazilian education 
system between 1987 and 2010. Section Two reviews and critically analyses the existing 
literature regarding the determinants of long term inequality, and the relationship 
between it and education - including the asset nature of education and its subsequent link 
to skill premiums - concluding with a discussion of the debate linking education as a 
solution to the problem.  
Section Three will present a study of the Brazilian education system between 1987 
and 2010. The study employs annual economic data for the period in question in order to 
present both the supply and demand side of the education system. At the same time, it 
uses questionnaire data from one of Brazil’s tertiary educational establishments, 
UNICAMP. The socio-economic data reveals how less than 35% UNICAMP students 
attended only public education;  61% of students enrolled had attended a pre-vestibular 
course; nearly 75% of subscribers failed to be enrolled at the first time of asking; and 
more than 60% of students were from families in the 9th and 10th income deciles. Taken 
together, the case study highlights how simply expanding education can actually 
perpetuate income inequalities, rather than correct them.  
After establishing that higher education in Brazil may not be accessible to low 
income households, Section Four will discuss the implications of the findings, and the 
specific contribution which the Brazilian education system may have had on persistent 
inequality. Finally, conclusions and recommendations will be offered in Section Five. 
 
 
                                                          
7 In 1969, the National Institute for Rural Settlement and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) was created in 
Brazil. 
8 Barros, Mendonça, and Henriques, ‘Education and equitable’, p.47. 
9 Gasparini, and Lustig, ‘The rise’; Székely and Montes. ‘Poverty and inequality’; López-Calva and 
Lustig, ‘Declining inequality’; Barros and Mendonça, ‘Os determinantes’; Barros, Mendonça, and 
Henriques, ‘Education and equitable’; Mohan and Sabot, ‘Educational expansion’. 
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2.Determinants of Long Run Inequality and Education 
In order to address and analyse Brazil’s high levels of inequality, it is necessary to 
explore its origins of unequal income distribution, and to what degree education has 
played a role. Historically, Latin America has suffered from high inequality; and many of 
the explanations for the problems in the region as a whole are closely related to the 
Brazilian experience. However, it must be acknowledged that the reasons behind such 
persistent inequality in the continent vary considerably. 
The theories that suggest the strongest historical legacy link the problem with the 
consequences of colonisation. These hypotheses suggest that some forms of colonisation 
involved the establishment of small groups of elites, who enjoyed exclusive access to rents, 
land, education, and political decision-making.
10
  The argument pioneered by Engerman 
and Sokoloff posits that colonies with labour intensive commodities featuring 
opportunities to utilise economies of scale resulted in unequal institutions. In Brazil, as in 
parts of the Caribbean, there was fertile soil and favourable climates which were 
conducive to cash crops such as sugar and coffee. These types of commodities were most 
cost-effectively produced on a large scale, using available slave labour. Communities 
which hosted these labour intensive products become populated by slaves available on 
world markets: between 1531-1855, around four million African slaves were moved to 
Brazil, over half of them arriving after 1781; and by the nineteenth century, the 
population of Brazil was 75-80% non-white,  compared to around 20% in the United 
States (US) and Canada. This slave demographic effectively institutionalised unequal access 
and opportunity.
11
  
By 1888, Brazilian law enshrined the abolition of slavery; but when this occurred, 
unequal distribution of wealth was used by the elite to create institutions which protected 
elite privileges and limited access to opportunity amongst the masses.
12
 In contrast, 
commodities and climates which had no opportunities for the economies of scale found in 
North America influenced more inclusive institutions.
13
 Education is regarded as among 
the institutions to be influenced by such inequality: as the elites could afford to fund their 
education privately through user fees without having to subsidise the masses, investments 
in it were not made; while high levels of inequality resulted in collective action problems in 
the establishment of universal education.
14
 
Acemoglu et al. also contribute to the endowments and colonisation explanation of 
long run inequality; although, rather than focusing on commodities; they choose instead 
to single out the mortality rate of colonies in order to help explain the inclusivity of 
institutions. The hypotheses here state that colonial administrators would set up extractive 
institutions, which lacked laws and rights, in locations with relatively high mortality rates, 
                                                          
10 Engerman and Sokoloff ‘Factor endowments, inequality’, p. 3. 
11 Ibid., pp. 8-9; Bértola, and Williamson, ‘Globalization in Latin’, p. 26. 
12 Engerman and Sokoloff, ‘Factor endowments, institutions’, pp. 11-12. 
13 Ibid., p. 3. 
14 Mariscal and Sokoloff, ‘Schooling, suffrage’, p. 163. 
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and therefore lower levels of settled populations. Conversely, areas with low mortality 
rates provided the incentive for more inclusive institutions for migrating populations.
15
  
However, Grafe and Irigoin have provided arguments which rebuff the perception 
that colonial rulers oversee such extractive regimes.
16
 In the case of Brazil, the Acemoglu 
et al. analysis becomes more problematic: it distinguishes the country as a low mortality 
location, and notes how difficult it is to categorize its mortality rate because of its size and 
climate variation; although this observation could again help to explain Brazil’s regional 
inequalities.
17
 Indeed, large proportions of Brazilian inequality could be claimed to be 
regionally driven: as is most apparent when incomes in the north-east and south-east 
regions are compared.
18
 Those approaches emphasising the importance of the colonial 
period would argue that these differences are the consequences of differences in the 
proportion of slave labour between one region and another; although it should be noted 
here that the South also had high levels of such labour: 75% of the slave population 
resided in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Minas Gerais.
19
  
Alternatively, there are approaches which emphasise the importance of 
commodities in influencing different rates of regional growth; and therefore, inequality.20 
Historically, the north-east produced cotton and sugar; but when Brazil’s comparative 
advantage shifted to the coffee exports of the south-east, large regional inequalities 
began to appear.21 
A study by IMF economists into the historical record of education in São Paulo 
strengthened the possibility that the distribution and provision of education could well be 
influenced by factors of immigration.
22
 The authors do not account for events prior to the 
twentieth century, but nevertheless identify a strong correlation among immigrants from 
nations with a form of public education, suggesting that areas which established this 
enjoyed clearly better educational outcomes at the end of the twentieth century. The 
study provides an interesting perspective by alluding to the effects of educational 
outcomes in the long term, and suggesting an element of path dependency. 
Yet colonial approaches fail to account for the relatively low levels of inequality 
found in Latin America and Brazil before the twentieth century: a time when European 
economies such as Spain experienced higher levels of inequality than Brazil. Therefore, 
approaches which do not focus specifically on the colonial period have also developed. 
One such hypothesis suggests that wealth and land asset concentration created by 
colonisation did not perpetuate inequalities, until changes in technologies in the form of 
                                                          
15 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, ‘Colonial origins’ 
16 Grafe and Irigoin, ‘A stakeholder empire’, p. 637. 
17 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, ‘Colonial origins’, p. 34. 
18 Due to the nature and limitations of this research, the analysis will primarily focus on the 
relationship of inequality and education on a national basis rather than regionally. 
19 Leff, ‘Economic development’, p. 253. 
20 Ibid., p. 245. 
21 Ibid., p. 256. 
22 Filho, Irineu, and Colistete, ‘Education performance’, p. 3 
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railroads and refrigeration resulted in large commercial opportunities.
23
 The growth of 
these did not result in the more equal society experienced by Western Europe, and 
predicted by the Kuznets curve;
24
 the reason for this, it is argued, is due to institutional 
developmental experiments of import-substitution industrialisation strategies, as well as  
international alliances with Latin American elite regimes during the Cold War.
25
 These 
enabled elites to maintain their privileges without either being held politically accountable, 
or had their excess rents questioned.  
The institutional hypothesis here appears to correspond more to the historical 
empirical data, although it fails to account for the apparent continuation of high 
inequality long after the end of colonisation; nor inward looking developmental strategies, 
Cold War alliances or fresh attempts at democratisation. 
Other authors have also questioned the idea that Brazil has always experienced 
high inequality. They too have alluded to the effects of globalisation on Latin American 
inequality, linking increased inequality with the effects of international trade rather than 
institutional choices. Milanovic et al. employed sources reporting on average income and 
data on social classes to conclude that until the late nineteenth century, Brazilian 
inequality was at the same level of OECD countries today.
26
 Brazil’s modern day problems 
were said to have been created by the international trade shift in Brazil’s favour in the late 
nineteenth century: with the help of developments in transportation, including 
refrigeration, a primary commodity boom drove up land and mineral earnings relative to 
incomes, increasing inequality by an estimated 26.2%.
27
 The international trade 
perspective put forward by Milanovic et al. appears to correspond to the historic empirical 
data on inequality, and could help explain the persistence of inequality following mid-
century institutional experiments and the fracturing of Cold War alliances. 
Data collated by Prados de la Escosura, shown in figure 3, contributes further to the 
idea that modern levels of inequality were reached at the turn of the nineteenth century.
28
 
Although authors such as Bértola have questioned the value of backward projected Gini-
coefficient measurements and maintain that inequality was high at the end of colonial rule 
(but in the form of power relations rather than income), they can provide no alternative 
evidence in this regard.
29
 
The majority of these conflicting approaches enjoy one thing in common: namely, 
broad agreement that high levels of inequality, regardless of their origins, have impacted 
upon the allocation and distribution of education as a public good. The approaches tend 
to agree that the resulting distribution and structure of education has been anything but 
conducive to growth, poverty alleviation and the eradication of high income inequality.   
                                                          
23 Coatsworth, ‘Structures, endowments’, p. 140. 
24 Kuznets, ‘Economic growth’ 
25 Coatsworth, ‘Structures, endowments’, p. 131. 
26 Milanovic, Lindert, and Williamson, ‘Pre-industrial’, p. 263. 
27 Williamson, ‘Five centuries’, p. 247. 
28 Prados de la Escosura, ‘Growth, inequality’, p. 39. 
29 Bértola, ‘Institutions and the historical’, p. 13-18. 
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2.1 Relationship of Education with Inequality 
Undoubtedly, education has played a role in creating the long term, persistent 
inequalities referred to above, regardless of their original cause. Paradoxically, education 
has also been the tool recommended to tackle economies with problems of high 
inequality. Before this chapter embarks on a discussion of the literature in this regard, it is 
necessary to clarify how education has such powerful policy potential as an asset, and 
how it can affect skill premiums. 
 
 
2.1.1 Education as an Asset 
Just as land, physical capital, and wealth are able to produce income, so too is an 
education. Economists have labelled education as human capital. In his seminal writings, 
from a macroeconomic perspective, Adam Smith referred to education as an investment in 
human capital with the characteristics of a public good.
30
 Human capital is an important 
investment: unlike physical capital, it is expandable, and does not depreciate on the same 
scale; it can move location with individuals, which is why ‘New Growth Theory’ 
distinguishes human capital as an important growth factor.
31
 Apart from its impact on 
incomes, education is an intrinsically valuable function for life itself, representing 
consumption good rather than an investment good.
32
 Moreover, as a result of 
technological change, the demand for skilled labour increased tremendously, in the form 
of more skills based employment. From a microeconomic perspective, education has 
become a signal to employers as to the level of skill and knowledge of the potential 
employee.
33
 It is therefore a form of investment for an individual that has future returns in 
the form of higher income. 
During the late 1950s and 1960s, there occurred a ‘human investment revolution in 
economic thought’.34 This revolution involved a group of Chicago economists, who 
promoted the idea that investment in human capital consisted of training, schooling, 
health, and residual knowledge.35  
In the case of education, ‘schooling’ was identified as an institution designed to 
offer attendees training which was not role-specific, but rather, advanced broad skills.36 
The Chicago economists significantly contributed to the evidence of a relationship 
                                                          
30 Smith and Sutherland, An inquiry, p. 166. 
31 Economic growth theory such as Romer (1986) emphasises how knowledge is an endogenous 
factor with increasing marginal productivity. 
32 Sen, Development as freedom, p. 11. 
33 Spence, ‘Job market’, p. 358. 
34 Bowman, ‘The human investment’, p. 112. 
35 Mincer, ‘Investment in human’, p. 285; Schultz, ‘Investment in human’, p. 9; Becker, ‘Human 
capital’, p. 16. 
36 Becker, ‘Human capital’, p. 37. 
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between education and higher wages. Similar to the classical view of physical capital, 
individuals with better skills and knowledge have higher productivity and are compensated 
at a higher rate. An individual can choose to defer their leisure time in favour of 
investments in education to increase their knowledge and skills for a higher rate of 
compensation in the labour market. 
Using this conceptual basis, studies confirmed that higher education levels 
corresponded with higher rates of income. The level of return varies on economic 
conditions where that education is employed. In the case of the US, Ashenfelter and 
Krueger first provided a more natural experiment by analysing genetically identical twins, 
thus eradicating workers ability and residual factors.37 Using sophisticated econometric 
techniques, some years later, Card produced similar results to Ashenfelter and Krueger: 
indicating that an additional year of schooling is worth an international average of 10% 
additional returns.38 Using US data, Card displays how there are increasing marginal 
returns of education, reaching a peak with PhD qualification.39 International research has 
identified Latin America and the Caribbean as the area with the highest average return to 
schooling.40  
Card’s US findings have been replicated in the case of Brazil, in such studies as 
Barros et al, showing that the first and last years of additional education have the greatest 
returns.41 In fact, returns to schooling in Brazil and other middle income economies are 
estimated to be 5% to 8% greater than in high income economies, due to a high degree 
of industrialisation alongside relatively low average levels of schooling.42 However, 
research in Brazil has also provided a check on the amount of influence which schooling 
has on increasing returns: suggesting that the effects of additional education decline by as 
much as one-third when family background is considered.43 With education being an 
asset, skill premiums are just one of the potential gains to education assets. 
 
 
2.1.2 Skill Premiums 
Adam Smith also commented on the perceived skill premium within an economy.
44
 
Social scientists have long deployed a supply and demand framework in order to illustrate 
how a skill premium exists in labour markets.
45
 The demand of skills is derived from 
consumers, who wish to purchase goods and services that require varying degrees of skills 
                                                          
37 Ashenfelter and Krueger, ‘Estimate of the economic’, p. 1171. 
38 Card, ‘The causal effect’, p. 1085. 
39 Ibid., p. 1807. 
40 Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, ‘Returns to investment’, p. 112. 
41 Barros, Carvalho, Franco, and Mendonça, ‘Markets, the state’, p. 50. 
42 Lam and Levison, ‘Age, experience’, p. 241. 
43 Lam and Schoeni ‘Effects of family’, p. 771. 
44 Smith and Sutherland, An inquiry, p. 97. 
45 Tinbergen, ‘Income differences’, p. 15. 
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to create. A top solicitor requires a huge amount of knowledge, learnt in a reputable 
institute of law education: whereas, for example, a removal labourer requires the skill of 
strength to carry out their duties, but this skill is derived from natural strength, which can 
be either literally natural, or gained through exercise.  
The supply of skills is influenced by demographic and institutional factors which 
provide the education and training needed to meet demands in the labour market. Skilled 
workers, who have undertaken education or a training investment, will not make the 
initial investments unless there is a good chance that they will receive an eventual return 
on them; and therefore, a higher rate of income compared to those who choose not to 
invest at all. 
Through factors such as international trade and technological change, the demand 
side can change quickly; while on the supply side, demographic features and institutions 
such as public education can affect the supply of skills. Tinbergen has described this 
process as a race between the provision of education and technological advance.
46
 As 
education is the mechanism which can provide more skilled workers, the fewer the skilled 
workers available, the higher the skill premium will be in their wages. Moreover, as trade 
is the mechanism which requires skilled labour, the more demand there is for skilled 
labour, the higher the skill premium will be. A cyclical nature to skill premiums has also 
been identified, in that the high skills required as a result of technological change also 
increase the chances of further technological change: which in turn increases the demand 
for high skilled labour and replacing low skilled labour with capital.
47
 
Above all, what becomes clear from reviewing the literature on education as an 
asset is that a large proportion of income inequality is merely a reflection of education 
inequality. 
2.1.3 Education as a Solution 
During the twentieth century, levels of education have become the most reliable 
indicators with which to predict incomes: meaning it can be assumed that if income 
inequality is to decrease, access to education must be evenly distributed across the 
population, and even skewed towards low-income households in order to tackle the 
existing income gap.
48
 This is a common prescription by scholars within recent and old 
literature focusing on both international and country specific cases. 
One of the more early links between education and inequality was put forward by 
Becker and Chiswick, building on Becker’s early work.
49
  Together, they comment on how 
the unequal distribution of education South America corresponds with income 
                                                          
46 Ibid., p. 35. 
47 Acemoglu, ‘Patterns of skill’, p. 220. 
48 At the same time, subsidies and redistributions of income must be pro-poor if there is to be a 
decrease in income inequality. 
49 Becker and Chiswick, ‘Education and the distribution’, p. 367. 
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distribution.
50
 Tinbergen also concludes his analysis by conjuring up a neat analogy of a 
‘race’: access to education must be more evenly distributed if it is to win the ‘race’ against 
technology, and combat income inequality pressures from a higher skill premium.
51
 
According to Székely and Montes, the Brazilian education system has not expanded 
rapidly enough to satisfy the demand for a highly educated labour force, thus failing 
Tinbergen’s ‘race’, and contributing to the widening of the income inequality gap.
52
 
A lot of work has been quick to applaud the influence of education policy on 
reducing income inequality. Barros et al. demonstrate how half of the decline in income 
inequality during two periods (1977-81 and 2001-7)
53
 in Brazil was due to an acceleration 
of educational progress and a decrease in the skill premium.
54
 Gasparini and Lustig have 
also attributed part of the recent decline in income inequality to basic education 
expansion during the 1990s and a reduction in the skill premium.
55
 
In terms of education’s effects on income inequality, there are said to be two 
channels: namely, quantity effect and price effect. The former holds that the greater the 
variation of education levels, the greater the income inequality. The latter has it that the 
larger the earnings differential per education level, the greater the income inequality.
56
 
Using the concept of the quantity affect, Sattinger highlights the potential effects of 
increased provisions of education.
57
 With an increase in the supply of skilled labour, the 
rate of returns for high skilled labour may decline.  
Influenced by the above, research specific to Brazil has also advised of the curing 
properties found in education. Government funded economic think tanks have published 
research which promotes the idea of education as a solution to high inequality levels. In 
particular, the Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), have published research 
which recommends that any education policy which  increases the proportion of the 
population who complete primary education will help reduce the inequality in education, 
and therefore in income.
58
 The authors go further by casting doubt on the existence of 
any better alternative policy recommendations; they argue that wage differentials by 
education level account for an estimated 35-50%, a high figure when compared 
internationally.
59
 Similar research by the same authors has recommended education as a 
potential equalizer of persistent inequalities, describing it as a ‘fundamental condition’.
60
 
                                                          
50 For the purpose of robustness, they carry out similar calculations with similar results for other 
regions and nations. 
51 Tinbergen, ‘Income differences’, p. 61. 
52 Székely and Montes, ‘Poverty and inequality’, p.633-40. 
53 Though inequality declined, it was not dramatic enough to solve Brazil’s continuing problem with 
the issue. 
54 Barros, Carvalho, Franco, and Mendonça, ‘Markets, the state’, p. 48. 
55 Gasparini, and Lustig, ‘The rise’, p. 705. 
56 Barros, Carvalho, Franco, and Mendonça, ‘Markets, the state’, p. 49. 
57 Sattinger, ‘Assignment models’, p. 871. 
58 Barros and Mendonça, ‘Os determinantes’, p. 51. 
59 Ibid., p. 48. 
60 Barros, Mendonça, and Henriques, ‘Education and equitable’, p. 43. 
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The authors base their recommendations on the finding that educational heterogeneities 
contribute to 40% of wage inequalities;
61
 and emphasize the inverted U-shaped 
relationship between mean schooling and inequality.
62
 They derive this relationship by 
arguing that when mean schooling is low, so too is inequality; and that similarly, when 
mean schooling is high but inequality peaks when mean schooling reaches intermediary 
levels. 
A similar conclusion is offered by Almeida dos Reis and Barros, even though their 
approach to inequality is derived from a regional perspective. Like others, they conclude 
that around half of wage inequalities in Brazil transpire from educational inequalities. They 
also conclude that this is due to a high skill premium within Brazil, and recommend a 
more broad distribution of education in order to decrease the skill premium.
63
  
Empirical research on the effects of education on inequality has not been 
constrained to Brazil. Mohan and Sabot illustrate how the expansion of secondary and 
tertiary education in Colombia during the 1970s applied pressure on income inequalities:  
calculating that the effects on inequality by increasing incomes through education 
(composition effects) were outweighed by that of reducing the skill premium (compression 
effect).
64
 Outside Latin America, Sabot collaborated with Knight and reached a similar 
conclusion in Tanzania and Kenya in 1980: namely, that educational expansion has the 
effect of reducing inequality.
65
  
However, some authors have questioned the healing power of education on 
unevenly distributed income.  In a study on behalf of the World Bank, Patrinos et al. show 
how increased educational investments are estimated to have different effects on income 
inequality; and conclude that these are due to job mobility, skill shortages, differing labour 
market links between productivity and pay, and different levels of access to education.
66
 
Their research found that education investment will result in increased inequality.
67
  
The above section has reviewed the literature which emphasises the equalising 
effects of education both nationally and internationally. The following chapter will analyse 
the Brazilian education system between 1987 and 2010, in order to consider how 
education itself impacts upon income inequality. 
                                                          
61 Ibid., p. 47. 
62 Ibid., p. 50. 
63 Reis and Barros. ‘Wage inequality’, p. 141. 
64 Mohan and Sabot, ‘Educational expansion’, p. 181. 
65 Knight and Sabot, ‘Educational expansion’, p. 1136. 
66 Patrinos, Ridao-Cano, and Sakellariou, ‘Estimating the returns’, p. 23. 
67 Ibid., p. 13. 
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3. Brazilian Education System Post Re-Democratisation 1987- 2010  
3.1 Supply-side of Education  
3.1.1 Structure 
At all levels in Brazil, education has been supplied by different types of institutions: 
be they municipal, state, federal, private or religious. Together, they are all responsible for 
the organisation of their own education services by working together to ensure that 
standards are consistent throughout Brazil.
68
 Table 3 displays the various levels of 
governance in the provision of Brazilian education. 
 
Table 3. Levels of Governance of Education 
Federal Ministry of Education (MEC) 
National Council of Education 
(CNE)* 
Council of Basic 
Education 
Higher 
Education 
Council 
State State Secretary of Education (SE) State Council of Education (CEE) 
Municipal Secretary/Department of Education Municipal Council of Education (CME) 
Public & Private 
Schools School councils (CE) 
 
Note: * Until 1995 when replaced by the two councils below 
Source: Inspired by Gadotti, ‘Contemporary Brazilian’, p. 128-9. 
 
The education system comprises two levels, basic education and higher education 
(ensino superior): the latter incorporating graduate and post-graduate education. Basic 
education consists of three tiers: pre-school education (educação infantil); basic education 
(ensino fundamental); and secondary education (ensino médio). Basic education is 
compulsory for children aged between seven and fourteen. Ensino fundamental takes a 
minimum of eight years to complete; while ensino médio lasts a minimum of three years, 
and is designed for 15-17 year olds. In order to enrol in further education, a student must 
have completed their previous level of study. The national education guidelines state that 
a school year comprises a minimum of 200 days with a maximum of 35 students per class, 
although many education institutions continued to operate for 180 days.
69
 
To ensure consistent levels and that students are ready to progress to the next 
stage of education, a national test, SAEB (Standard Assessment for Basic Education) is 
                                                          
68 Constitution of The Federative Republic of Brazil 1988, Article 211. 
69 Gadotti, ‘Contemporary Brazilian’, p. 130. 
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taken by 10 and 14 year olds to assess ensino fundamental; ENEM (Exame Nacional do 
Ensino Médio) by 17 year olds; and Provão at Ensino Superior institutions. All help to 
compare the individual performance of educational institutions. The ENEM also provides 
the means with which to gain points towards ProUni, a funding system for private 
university expenses. In order to enrol in a public ensino superior institute, students are 
required to pass an entry examination: known for the majority of the second half of the 
twentieth century as a vestibular. It is co-ordinated by organisations individually chosen by 
each higher education institution.70 
 
Table 4. Structure of the Brazilian Basic Education System 
Age Séries Brazilian Structure Previous Terminologies 
1 
 Educação Infantil 
Ensino Pré-Escola/Pré-Primario/ 
Pré-1.⁰ Grau. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 1st 
Ensino Fundamental 1.⁰ Grau. 
8 2nd 
9 3rd 
10 4th 
11 5th 
12 6th 
13 7th 
14 8th 
15 1st 
Ensino Médio 2.⁰ Grau. 16 2nd 
17 3rd 
possible 
4th 18 Ensino Médio or Ensino Superior 2/3.⁰ Grau. 
18+  Ensino Superior 3.⁰ Grau. 
 
Note: Shading indicates grade at which examinations are undertaken.  
Source: Inspired by Alberto Rodriguez (2002) in Verner, ‘Education and its 
poverty’, p. 16 and Gadotti, ‘Contemporary Brazilian’, p. 130, Anuário 
Estatístico do Brasil 1982-2011. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the supply of educational establishments in Brazil at all levels 
between 1981 and 2011. The statistics display an increase in education supply over the 
period (62,405 extra education units). Both the private and public sectors have increased 
by similar numbers; however, the former began at such a low level that it represents one 
of the most notable changes over the last thirty years.  
                                                          
70 See Empirical UNICAMP Vestibular Data 1987-2011 for more details. 
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From the 1930s onwards, the Brazilian higher education system became more and 
more overstretched: resulting ultimately in vast levels of reform in 1968.
71
 Ever since the 
military dictatorship opened the door to the expansion of private higher education in that 
year, the latter has continued to expand, and come to dominate the supply of higher 
education.72  
Pré-escola has also rapidly expanded over the period in question: albeit, more 
through public than private suppliers. Surprisingly, ensino fundamental has contracted: a 
decrease which would have been even more severe was it not for an expansion by private 
education. Apart from pré-escola, the public education provision at the level of Ensino 
médio has expanded more rapidly than any other level of education, particularly at state 
governance. Both public and private supply of ensino superior level has also increased, but 
to a significantly greater extent amongst the private sector. 
When analysing the supply side of education, as well as observing the structure of 
the system, it is also important to establish the extent of its success in engaging with the 
population. Figure 5 shows the quantity of enrolments from 1987-2010 at the four levels 
of education. Despite the data revealing accounting inconsistencies regarding 
categorisations over time, it can still provide a crude illustration of the coverage.
73
  
As would be expected, enrolments at all levels of education have increased: albeit 
more in some areas than others. The largest rise was at ensino superior level: chiefly driven 
by an expansion in the private sector at the turn of the century.  
The next largest increase occurred at ensino médio, driven entirely by the public 
provision which began in the early 1990s, while the private provision actually contracted.  
Fernando Henrique Cardoso had campaigned for his second term as President (1999-
2002) with a promise to tackle inequalities, by using measures which included 
education.
74
 The Cardoso administration has been accredited with the observed increase 
in secondary education enrolment, by using policy instruments such as Bolsa Escola, a cash 
transfer designed to strengthen education incentives.
75
  
Strikingly, ensino fundamental enrolments did not expand at a pace similar to other 
levels of education, and maintained similarly modest increases at both public and private 
level. 
After observing the structure and coverage of education, the next chapter takes a 
look at how it is financed; its cost effectiveness at each level of education; and attempts 
cross country comparisons. 
 
                                                          
71 Schwartzman, ‘Brazil: opportunity’, p. 101. 
72 Siqueira, ‘Higher education’, p. 170. 
73 An example of accounting inconsistencies is one student counting for more than one enrolment; 
as well as annual data being missing. 
74 Bethell and Nicolau, ‘Politics in Brazil’, p. 267. 
75 Skidmore, ‘Brazil's persistent’, p. 144. 
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3.1.3 Financing 
As early as in 1824, the principle of free elementary education was instigated as a 
requirement for state administrations to provide, albeit this was generally ignored, leaving 
the majority of the population illiterate.
76
 In 1930, a Ministry of Education (MEC) was 
created; and the constitutions between 1934 and 1946 began to include specific chapters 
on education, insisting that a national system should be provided by the federal 
government, and that states and municipalities spend between 10 and 20 % of their 
revenue on education.
77
 From 1930 -1945, a rapid expansion in public education 
occurred;
78
 and during the democratic years of the Second Republic between 1946 and 
1964, free tuition in public institutions, repeatedly demanded by students and academics 
alike, became increasingly common.79   
Yet despite these continuous reforms, by 1991, 20.1% of people over 14 years of 
age remained illiterate.
80
 The 1980s had been overshadowed by the debt crisis which 
gripped Latin America: in order to combat it, international financial institutions advised all 
Latin American governments to retract social spending and focus on debt repayment, 
which thereby encouraged further expansion of the private education sector and user 
fees.
81
 The authoritarian and military rule in place at the beginning of this period 
countenanced no public engagement on education policies; but by 1985, re-
democratisation was underway.  
The education system is financed by all three levels of Brazilian government. 
Around 70% of revenue is generated at union level, a fifth through state revenues, and a 
tenth through municipalities.
82
 It has been questioned how practical it is for low income 
municipalities to compete with their richer counterparts on providing the same quality of 
public education.
83
 
Article 206, item V, of the new constitution of 1988, re-established that among all 
other levels of education, higher education from public institutions should be tuition 
free.
84
 The constitution itself was constructed by socially organised groups, with the aim of 
providing an education system which could eradicate illiteracy from Brazil through 
universal primary education.
85
  
                                                          
76 Gadotti, ‘Contemporary Brazilian’, p. 123. 
77 Ibid., p. 126. 
78 Ibid., p. 126. 
79 Siqueira, ‘Higher education’, p. 170. 
80 IBGE, ‘Taxa de’, http://seriesestatisticas.ibge.gov.br/series.aspx?vcodigo=CD101&sv=8&t=taxa-de-
analfabetismo-de-pessoas-de-15-anos-ou-mais-de-idade-por-grupos-de-idade, retrieved 24th 
August, 2012. 
81 Siqueira, ‘Higher education’, p. 171. 
82 See Table 7. 
83 Verner, ‘Education and its poverty’, p. 16. 
84 Siqueira, ‘Higher education’, p. 171 
85 Gadotti, ‘Contemporary Brazilian’, p. 124. 
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Also included in the new constitution was the National Fund for Basic Education 
(FUNDEF). This was designed to ensure a level playing field regarding education 
throughout Brazil. It ensured that the federal government would spend 18% of its income 
on education; while states and municipalities would spend 25%, thereby decentralising 
some of the federal role in education.
86
 
Even today, ensino fundamental does not require service fees, and is funded by 
municipalities and states. Each municipality is required by the Federal government to 
spend 25% of its tax income on ensino fundamental.
87
 Ensino médio is funded by the 
state government and is also free from fees - although there is the option of enrolling into 
privately funded primary and secondary education institutions which require tuition fees, 
regulated by individual states that set a price ceiling. This ceiling was seriously affected by 
the inflation of the late 1980s.
88
  
Once a student has enrolled into higher education, whether they contribute directly 
towards the cost depends upon what kind of institution they are studying in. Public 
universities do not require tuition fees; while private higher education demands a 
contribution from the student. Private university fees can range dramatically and tend to 
differ by location and course.
89
 To help with the cost of higher education, the University 
for All Program (ProUni) was created in 2004, and introduced scholarships; those 
institutions that subscribe to this program receive tax breaks as an incentive. This is in 
addition to the fund for Student Financing of Higher Education (FIES), a program 
organised by the Ministry of Education to fund undergraduate students. 
Table 8 illustrates expenditure in the form of proportion of Gross National Income. 
Expenditure on education has hovered between the 3% and 5% region, but has been 
slowly rising. A major change over the period has been the increase in expenditure in 
secondary level education, as opposed to primary level. Tertiary level expenditure is around 
a fifth, but declining over time: Table 9 illustrates how Brazil’s tertiary costs have 
historically been comparatively high. 
Furthermore, when considering the expenditure on each education level, and the 
quantity of enrolments per education level, it is possible to understand the investment 
made per enrolment. Table 10 illustrates the contrasting levels of investment for various 
students. What soon becomes obvious is the gap between the investment per student at 
tertiary and all other levels. The average investment per student at all levels of education 
except tertiary from 2000-10 was R$1,721, compared to R$12,130 at tertiary level.
                                                          
86 Schwartzman, ‘The challenges’, p. 25. 
87 Gadotti, ‘Contemporary Brazilian’, p. 129. 
88 Braga, Primo, and Paulo, ‘Private education’, p. 486. 
89 The 2003 monthly course fees in Rio De Janerio state ranged from R$199 for Pedagogy to 
R$1,242 for Medicine. 
19 
 
Table 8. Expenditure on education as % of GNI, % of expenditure on 
education by level 1989-2006 
 
   
Year 
  
     
   
1989 1995 2000 2006 
       Current expenditure on education 
as % of GNI 
 
4.49 4.32 3.88 4.79 
  
     Percentage 
distribution 
of public 
current 
expenditure 
on education 
by level 
Pre-primary 
 
n.a. 5.09 8.39 7.28 
Primary 
 
49.42 48.39 30.26 31.73 
Secondary 
 
6.97 20.33 38.70 44.26 
Tertiary 
 
25.93 26.19 22.64 16.73 
Not allocated by 
level 
 
17.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Note: n.a. = no data available 
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics online database, 
http://www.uis.unesco.org/Pages/default.aspx?SPSLanguage=EN, retrieved 24th August, 
2012. 
Table 9. Unit Cost in Public Institutions (In US dollars) 
 
 
Country Unit Cost Year 
   Japan 5,968 1985 
UK   
Universities 12,950 1986 
Polytechnics 6,160 1986 
United States 8,724 1984 
Philippines 3,492 1985 
Spain 906 1985 
Australia 6,126 1987 
Brazil - using official exchange rate 7,930 1988 
Brazil - using parallel exchange rate 4,760 1988 
Venezuela 1,625 1989 
Chile 1,030 1990 
 
Sources: OECD (1989); James (1989); Paul and Wolyneck (1990) in Birdsall and Sabot, 
‘Opportunity foregone’, p. 537. 
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Table 10. Public Investment Direct estimate of education per student by level of education in nominal (R$1,00) 2000-10. 
 
 Level of Education 
        
 Educação 
Básica 
Educação 
Infantil 
Ensino Fundamental Ensino 
Médio 
Ensino 
Superior All levels  1st- 4th séries 5th-8th séries 
        
2000 807.58 923.59 794.40 810.65 770.30 8927.38 970.28 
2001 901.71 898.00 845.40 950.94 943.73 9500.09 1081.71 
2002 1005.32 951.56 1110.91 1031.63 747.46 10135.06 1213.93 
2003 1116.02 1196.91 1176.20 1117.41 937.76 9705.91 1329.02 
2004 1283.94 1372.37 1358.73 1373.60 939.21 10572.50 1512.93 
2005 1440.00 1372.87 1606.62 1529.94 1004.12 11363.35 1699.88 
2006 1772.82 1532.60 1824.98 2003.91 1417.01 11820.26 2041.73 
2007 2163.22 1954.06 2273.52 2368.70 1734.64 13088.55 2466.61 
2008 2632.07 2206.45 2760.88 2945.80 2122.12 14762.58 2995.33 
2009 2972.34 2276.33 3203.63 3341.71 2336.14 15582.10 3381.24 
2010 3579.90 2942.45 3858.89 3905.14 2960.47 17971.91 4087.21 
 
Source: INEP, http://portal.inep.gov.br/estatisticas-gastoseducacao-despesas_publicas-p.a._precos.htm, retrieved 24th August, 2012.
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3.2 Demand-side of Education 
3.2.1 Demographics 
In 1991, the population of Brazil stood at 146.8 million. Some 66 million of the 
total population were aged between 0 and 19: nearly 45% in total. By 2010, the 
population stood at 191 million, a 30% increase in just 19 years. However, the proportion 
of 0-19 year olds had decreased by 5%, and the share of the population they represent 
had fallen to a third. Population growth was mainly fuelled by those aged between 30 
and 60.90  
All things remaining constant, this change would result in a decreasing demand for 
education; but this is to assume that demand for education had been satisfied in the first 
place, and a figure of total enrolments in 1991 of 37.8 million would suggest otherwise. 
This population growth has mainly been caused by an increase in per capita income, an 
increase in health services, and medical advances during the period.91  
As with other parts of Latin America, Brazil has continued to urbanise at a 
considerable rate. In 1991, 75.47% of the population lived in urban locations; whereas by 
2010, this figure had risen to 84.36%.92 Historically, populaces have tended to remain in 
coastal regions; not in the harsh climate of the Amazon and surrounding areas. Even so, 
the increase in population has mostly occurred in the North (in states such as Pará and 
Amazonas), as well as the Central West (in Mato Grosso). Overall, however, the 
population remains concentrated in the South East (42.1% in 2010) and North East 
(27.8% in 2010): dominated by the states of Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro 
in the South; Bahia and Pernambuco in the North.93 
The question of race has provided a further perspective for studies on the Brazilian 
education system; it is important to understand the race composition of the country.94 
Statistical institutions in Brazil tend to categorize their most populous races as white, 
black, brown, or yellow: a somewhat ambiguous method. Over the period in question, 
race composition has tended to remain relatively stable. In 1991, the largest racial groups 
were white (51.56%), brown (42.45%), and black (5%). In 2010, only the category of 
brown had experienced a decrease (9%).
95
  
 
3.2.2 Households 
The experience of households is also a factor influencing demand for education. A 
main theme of this paper analyses how persistent income inequality is influenced by the 
                                                          
90 See table 11. 
91 Bethell, Latin America, p. 13. 
92 See table 12. 
93 See table 12. 
94 Guimarães, ‘Entrance into’. 
95 See table 13. 
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education system; but this relationship could also be cyclical. Distribution of income may 
also affect demand for education: in the sense that if income distribution is not shared out 
evenly, and instead, skewed towards the top, private education may only be affordable for 
households with a certain level of income.  
If household income is so low that the opportunity cost of education becomes so 
high in terms of lost potential income from labour wages, demand for education will 
inevitably fall. Alternatively, if household income rises, the opportunity cost of education 
falls.
96
 An increase in household income also increases ability to pay for private, rather 
than public education: assuming that the quality of private education is worth any 
additional cost. 
To illustrate the movements in household income and income distribution, Figure 6 
shows both the average household monthly income and each average household monthly 
income per income decile. Average household monthly income has risen by a quarter, 
ceteris paribus; this would have led to an increase in demand for education. All deciles 
have increased; but the lower half of the scale has increased more rapidly than the upper 
one. However, the difference between incomes in the highest and lowest tenth of earners 
has increased, and remains at a rate of almost forty five times higher. 
A policy of a compulsory minimum wage may also affect household income and 
therefore demand for education. A minimum wage is designed to set a floor price, which 
increases the income of the lowest paid households; it can therefore increase the capacity 
of low income households to opt for long term returns of education, rather than short 
term returns of labour wages. The minimum wage is also tied to other social programs of 
the Federal government: therefore, an increase in its level can result in a general increase 
in social assistance. That said, if the minimum wage is set too high, incentives to enter the 
labour market rather than education may prove overwhelming. 
Figure 7 illustrates how the minimum wage has recovered from the early 1990s 
onwards. The inflationary period prior to Plano Real is evident due to the zigzag effect; 
but following Plano Real, there has been a gradual increase in the minimum wage back to 
the levels seen at the start of the period in question. However, in 2000, the 
complementary law 103 allowed states to set a minimum monthly salary higher than the 
federal level; the data presented therefore takes the highest rate of minimum monthly 
salary. During the period under analysis, the average monthly minimum wage was R$367: 
which is around the level of income of the 6th tenth of household income distribution.  
                                                          
96 Child labour is prohibited under the age of 14, but remains prevalent. 
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3.3 Empirical UNICAMP Vestibular Data 1987-2010 
3.3.1 UNICAMP and the Vestibular 
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) is a state-maintained public 
university, located in Brazil’s most populous state, which also currently has the third 
highest average household income per capita. It was established in 1966, and has rapidly 
become one of Brazil’s most prestigious universities. In 2012, the Times Higher Education 
World University Rankings placed UNICAMP at between 276 and 300: this may seem low 
by international comparison, but it was one of only three South American universities 
considered in the rankings.97 The Academic Ranking of World Universities also placed 
UNICAMP second in Brazil in 2010.98 UNCAMP’s admissions range from graduate to PhD 
candidates; while its programmes range from Computer Engineering to Medicine, with 
notable alumni such as Paulo Renato de Souza, former Minister of Education. Admission 
into UNICAMP is gained by completing the vestibular. 
These are examinations which determine who enters higher education. From 1961 
until 1996, entrance examinations were required by law; but in December 1996, Law No. 
9394: Law of Guidelines and Bases of National Education (LDB) established that it was the 
responsibility of individual institutions to decide on entrance conditions. The law was 
aimed at tackling unequal opportunities of higher education: though many prestigious 
universities continued to use the vestibular system. All vestibular exams must comply with 
the general guidelines of the Conselho Nacional de Educação (National Education 
Council); and since 1995, the Higher Education Council. The CNE was created after the 
1996 National Education Law (Lei de Diretrizes e Bases (LDB)), after it was thought that its 
predecessor, the Federal Council of Education, had become too closely aligned with 
private business interests. The new education laws also allow more autonomy to 
education institutions.99 
Once a student has successfully graduated from ensino médio, they are free to 
enter the vestibular. However, some students may choose to undertake a course 
(cursinho) which helps prepare them for the actual examination. Students who failed to 
gain entrance through this system may retake the examination on future occasions: in 
practice, this means that it may take many students more than one attempt at a vestibular 
in order to gain admission. Examinations tend to be over-subscribed:  leading to a high 
degree of competition between students.  
The ENEM, first implemented in 1998, has also become a tool with which to 
determine entrance to higher education in more recent times. Some higher education 
institutions, including UNICAMP since 1999, use ENEM results to credit students’ entrance 
                                                          
97 Times Higher Education, ‘Top South American Universities 2011-2012’. 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2011-2012/south-america.html, 
retrieved 24th August, 2012. 
98 Academic Ranking of World Universities, ‘Academic Ranking of World Universities – 2010, Brazil’, 
http://www.arwu.org/Country2010Main.jsp?param=Brazil, retrieved 24th August, 2012. 
99 World Bank, ‘Higher education’, p. 16. 
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examination scores, the influence of the ENEM results has been steadily increasing. 
UNICAMP’s annual entrance examinations are administered by the Permanent 
Commission for Vestibular (COMVEST), and considered to be amongst the most 
demanding around.  
A vestibular consists of examinations on 3-5 subjects, including general knowledge. 
COMVEST structure their exams in two stages: the first is a multiple choice and essay 
exam, while the second is solely essay-based. The first stage is held all over the country in 
various cities, which helps reduce expenses for students. The second is held in UNICAMP 
itself. After the first stage, depending on results, applicants can be rejected and eliminated 
from taking part in the second.  An entrance fee is also payable for most vestibulars.
100
  
In UNICAMP, an Affirmative Action and Social Inclusion Programme (PAAIS) began 
in 2004. It was one of the first universities to introduce such measures.
101
 The programme 
was designed to help publically educated students, and develop a broader ethnic and 
cultural diversity. It automatically allocates qualifying applicants credits to their vestibular 
results. Additionally, low income household and public education students are eligible for 
registration discounts or even waivers.
102
 In 2001, some higher education institutions 
began to introduce quotas. Left to individual universities to construct, the debate has 
centred upon the best, most effective form of affirmative action – whether based on race 
or socio-economic factors. UNICAMP has yet to introduce any quotas. 
 
 
3.3.2 Socio-Economic Profiles 
As part of the vestibular registration, applicants are required to complete a socio-
economic questionnaire form along with their application. Potential students are then 
identified, so their progress can be tracked. The questionnaire is designed to be completed 
by the candidate, and is therefore in parts subjective and open to a margin of error. 
Answers regarding what type of school the student had previously attended are less likely 
to result in errors contrasted with others on the nature of household income. However, as 
with most questionnaires on income, it appears that students have little incentive to 
exaggerate answers; far more to understate them in the hope of receiving financial 
assistance. 
By extracting the data from COMVEST for the period between 1987 and 2010, it is 
possible to identify factors which were common of students enrolling into UNICAMP.
103
 
                                                          
100 Registration fees for UNICAMP stood at R$115 in 2010. 
101 UNICAMP, ‘Deliberação CONSU-A-012/2004’, 
http://www.pg.unicamp.br/deliberacoes_consu.php?ano=2004&pagina=1, retrieved 24th August, 
2012. 
102 In 2010, the fee waiver was for students who were either unemployed, or receiving less than 
two minimum wages per month. 
103 See tables 15-29. 
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First, between 1987 and 2010, 982,582 individuals applied for a place at UNICAMP, but 
only 55,923 were enrolled: a ratio of 17.6 subscribers per place. 70.7% of subscribers 
were aged between 17 and 19, although older age cohorts had better enrolment success 
rates. Linked to this is that applicants who had previously taken a vestibular were more 
successful that those who had not; nearly three quarters of subscribers will fail to be 
enrolled at the first time of asking. 
Observing the level of ensino fundamental, only 35% of subscribers attended only 
public school; and only 5% of these students were successful in the vestibular. Conversely, 
63.3% of subscribers had attended some form of private education, and 6% of them 
were successfully enrolled. Moreover, 1 in 16.3 subscribers who attended only private 
education were successfully enrolled, compared to 1 in 19.7 who attended only public 
education. During the period in question, the number of subscribers who attended only 
private education increased from 22% to 58%, whereas the number of subscribers who 
attended only public education decreased from 55% to 25%. 
Ensino médio demonstrates a similar divide. 29% of subscribers attended only a 
public school, with 5.9% passing the vestibular; whereas 69% of subscribers attended 
some form of private school, and 5.6% of these students passed the vestibular. The 
number of subscribers who had attended only private schools increased from 45% to 
68%, whereas the number of subscribers to have attended only public schools decreased 
from 39% to 25%. 
Another key factor in the process appears to be whether a student undertakes a 
cursinho (pre-vestibular course). During the period analysed, 56% of subscribers and 61% 
of enrolled students attended a pre-vestibular course. In other words, 1 in 16.1 subscribers 
who attended a pre-university preparatory course were successfully enrolled, compared 
with 1 in 19.9 who did not. 
One of the most revealing findings from the questionnaires suggesting a possible 
link to income inequality was that regarding family income in relation to the minimum 
salary.
104
 The family income of subscribers appears to be evenly spread between the 
different ranges of minimum salaries. Students who come from families with an income of 
less than 5 times the minimum monthly salary had similar success rates to those from 
higher income families. That said though, students from families with an income of the 
minimum monthly salary or less had a 1 in 23 success rate; compared to 1 in 17 for 
families with an income of between 10 and 40 times the monthly minimum salary. 
However, 58% of subscribers and 59% of students come from families with more than 
ten times the minimum monthly salary. 
Using a social mobility perspective, 41% of subscribers and 42% of enrolled 
student fathers were professionals, managers, and directors or owners of medium-sized 
enterprises. Subscribers whose father’s occupation was in the category of senior, political, 
administrative o owners of a large company were 26% more successful in gaining 
                                                          
104 1994 and 1995 have had to be omitted because their categories could not be aggregated with 
the whole period. 
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enrolment than those whose father was employed in a routine, non-manual occupation. 
Disturbingly, 45% of subscribers and 48% of enrolled students’ fathers were educated to 
a level of graduate or higher: with 1 in 16 subscribers whose father had completed higher 
education or further successfully enrolled, compared with 1 in 25 who did not attend 
school. 
The next section will discuss how much can be interpreted from the findings of the 
socio-economic profiles, as well as the demand and supply side of education during the 
period under analysis; and how they have contributed to persistent income inequalities. 
 
 
4.0 A Mechanism of Inequality 
Combining the information presented on the Brazilian education system between 
1987 and 2010, it is possible to see how the system has contributed to persistent 
inequality in Brazil. Using the data regarding the number of schools across Brazil, it is 
possible to estimate that having been around 245,061 establishments in 1987, this rose to 
some 281,855 by 2010:  a 15% expansion in school establishments.
105
 Despite this, the 
supply of education as measured by enrolments managed to expand by an estimated 43% 
over the same period, which does suggest a decrease in quality, through factors such as 
class sizes.
106
  
In 1991, there were 37.8 million enrolments from the 66 million 0-19 year olds, 
rising to 49.5 million enrolments from 62.9 million citizens of school age by 2010. 
Additionally, with average household incomes rising by 25%, families are now less likely 
to send their younger members in search of labour wages and more likely to make long 
term educational investments. This suggests that, while progress has been slow over the 
period, there was the potential for an excess demand for education, which in turn can 
result in excess demand for skilled workers, resulting in a high skill premium.  
For Jan Tinbergen, Brazil’s education system had lost the race against technological 
advances. With the most highly rated universities producing the most skilled labour, public 
universities in Brazil are more highly regarded than the alternative private universities.
107
 
Therefore, how the skill premium is gained due to educational outcomes in relation to 
household incomes can affect the income inequality of a nation; the UNICAMP data 
suggests that there is an advantage in favour of high income households in gaining the 
education necessary to achieve future skill premiums. 
Although UNICAMP was one of the earliest public universities to introduce 
progressive measures and target a more inclusive strategy into its enrolment system, and 
                                                          
105 The only estimated element of the 1987 figure is the Educação Infantil. 
106 Again only the 1987 Educação Infantil element of the enrolment figure is an estimate. 
107 The relation between prestige and high income could be strengthened with a comparative study 
of graduate income from different higher education establishments. 
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although there have been encouraging signs over the period as a whole, there is a 
noticeable disadvantage for potential students of low income households. Given that the 
majority of UNICAMP students have attended some form of private education, this 
suggests that households that cannot afford this for their children are disadvantaged.  
Moreover, such has been the increasing prevalence of the pre-vestibular course 
over recent years, and its apparent effectiveness in helping students pass the entrance 
examination, these courses constitute a potential marginal cost in any attempt to enrol in 
a public university; this will clearly be of greater proportional cost to low income 
households. A World Bank case study into Brazilian higher education estimated that the 
cost of pre-vestibular courses is a minimum of two to three times the minimum monthly 
salary, although they vary according to quality.
108
  
Finally, nearly three quarters of subscribers will fail to be enrolled first time; this 
increases the cost disproportionately on low income households, who find it more difficult 
to support the potential student during vestibular attempts. These three barriers to low 
income households are reflected in the findings that 62% of subscribers and 65% of 
enrolments are from families in the 9th and 10th income deciles of Brazil. With 
opportunities to attain skill premiums appearing to favour high income households, the 
potential to create income inequalities already existed; but the picture becomes more 
alarming when public expenditure is considered. 
It is observable that the public financing of the Brazilian education system has 
tended to expand at secondary level, while the private sector has helped expand higher 
education. Households can of course opt to attend private universities; but low-income 
households incur far higher proportional costs. In general, public expenditure on tertiary 
education was high: high as a percentage of educational expenditure; high in the sense of 
per unit cost relative to other nations; and 12 times higher per student than at other 
levels. With higher education accounting for an estimated 2.4% of all public enrolments 
from 1987-2010, it has on average amounted to 22.87% of public education 
expenditure.  
Given the potential of a high skill premium, relatively high public expenditure per 
student at tertiary level, and assuming that the observations regarding the socio-economic 
profiles of UNICAMP students apply to the majority of public universities, there are all the 
ingredients of a regressive education system. The regressive label that this dissertation 
assigns to the education system is in line with Skidmore’s comments that it is a ‘significant 
distributional bonanza’.
109
 The persistent element of the income inequality that the 
education system helps maintain is apparent when considering that the applicants of 
UNICAMP appear to be from households with skilled workers and parents educated to 
university level: a strong looping effect is evident. Studies on the University of São Paolo 
(USP) have concluded similar findings: which strengthens the possibility that unequal 
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opportunities in public higher education can be identified nationwide, not just at 
UNICAMP.
110
  
The argument that a generational looping effect is evident is further strengthened 
by the findings of a 1964 vestibular in the state of Guanabara (now Rio de Janeiro), which 
shows that 69.8% of candidates attended private school.
111
 The same study, using a social 
class framework based on the father’s occupation, concludes that 55.9% of candidates 
were in the top two social classes; as opposed to only 7.5% in the bottom class.
112
 The 
view that the quality of secondary private education is superior to its public counterpart is 
strengthened by studies into the 2002 ENEM results, which found that private students 
outperformed public ones.
113
 
The findings presented in this case study concentrate on enrolments and the 
opportunities of higher education; but similar data has been presented from the 
perspective of the success rates of students in graduating, thus strengthening the 
argument of unequal educational asset distribution. Using the Provão data of 1998 for all 
types of higher education, it is possible to conclude that only 5% of graduates come from 
39.5% of the lowest income households; compared to 10% coming from the top 1.5% 
of highest income households.
114
  
This dissertation has also analysed inequality through an income or even a Marxist 
tradition of class perspective, but the data could potentially reveal influences regarding 
race and gender, which unfortunately entails considerably more breadth than the 
limitations of this research allow. 
It appears that, during the period in question, the Brazilian government has 
concentrated on increasing education at primary and secondary levels, with the objective 
of increasing literacy rates across the nation; while leaving the private sector to expand the 
supply of higher education and maintaining their free-from-tuition public universities. By 
doing so, they have helped create a system which results in publically educated secondary 
students having to pay for higher education in private universities,  because the quality of 
education they received at public secondary school leaves them at a clear disadvantage in 
terms of being successful in passing the public university entrance examinations.  
Various levels of governance have sought to introduce measures to correct the 
disadvantage faced by publically educated students; but a criticism of such measures is 
that it simply retracts the accountability of public secondary schools in delivering a high 
quality education. The data suggests that this perhaps is indeed the case: as the number 
of subscribers who attended only private schools increased, while the converse fell. This 
research is not based around a public v private debate: it simply echoes the sentiments of 
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a World Bank paper, which concludes that public services should be made more ‘private’ 
and efficient; and private services should become more publically focused.
115
 
The findings of this dissertation do not contribute to or strengthen any of the 
arguments made as to why or when Latin America became highly unequal in terms of 
income. It does add further value to the observations made by various theorists that 
educational asset distribution being unequal is one of the key outcomes; but it does not 
side with inequality arguments relating to colonisation or globalisation representing the 
starting point for such an outcome. 
Scholars and policymakers who have advocated an expansion of education as a 
means with which to correct income inequality have linked education expansion with a fall 
in skill premiums.
116
 However, they appear to concentrate merely on the supply of 
education; and neglect the education system as a whole. Expanding education could 
indeed lower the skill premium of labour educated to secondary level, but effects on 
income inequality may be limited if newly secondary educated students from low income 
households cannot compete with students from high income households. If the higher 
education system is tilted in favour of high income households and financed regressively, 
the impact of educational expansion will be diluted.  
Tackling inequalities through education is not as simple as just increasing supply, 
but also about ensuring a level playing field to all households regardless of supply.
117
 It is 
not practical to replicate policy prescriptions which have been deemed a success in 
countries such as Colombia, Tanzania, and Kenya, while these prescriptions negate 
specific education system architecture. Therefore, there is also a flipside to the suggestion 
that increased education represents a solution to inequalities. Behrman et al. have 
recommended that any further spending on tertiary education may have a negative 
contribution towards intergenerational mobility.
118
 The findings are also in line with the 
conclusions of Goñi et al, who argue that Latin American and Western European 
inequality are at relatively similar levels before taxes and transfers; but Western Europe’s 
taxes and transfers reduce inequalities by 15%, yet a figure of just 2% in Latin America.
119
 
The architecture of the education system is Brazil could provide Goñi et al. with a form of 
redistribution which is actually perpetuating inequalities. 
With free tuition universities becoming common during the Second Republic, it 
appears that whenever reform of the status quo on tuition is debated, there is a collective 
dismissal from both students and teaching unions; and any potential reform is viewed as 
toxic.
120
 This type of educational change has occurred in other countries: England, for 
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example, also had free tuition public universities before the Teaching and Higher 
Education Act in 1998, which introduced capped tuition fees for all universities based on 
the ability to pay, although England had not endured such historic extremes of inequality 
during the previous 50 years.
121
 Chile and other South American countries charge tuition 
fees using loans, regardless of whether the higher education establishment is public or 
private; indeed, more and more of Chile’s higher education is performance related.  
Moreover, in South East Asia, economies such as South Korea  also expanded 
education between 1976 and 1986; but at the same time, the importance of quality of 
education was stressed, unlike in much of Latin America. In contrast, South East Asian 
education expansion did not mean that investment per student fell; on the contrary, while 
the supply of books and facilities ensured that repetition and dropout rates remained low, 
while test scores increased.
122
 By maintaining quality education, South Korea was able to 
increase its labour supply of highly skilled workers, reduce the skill premium and reduce 
income inequality.
123
 Interestingly, this mainly occurred during a period of authoritarian 
rule. 
Democratisation is sometimes hailed as the ultimate means of equality and 
accountability - yet the question of educational equality at higher education level has yet 
to be tackled. It would be interesting to establish exactly what the barriers to reform 
amount to; and why, given its many supposed potential benefits, democratic institutions 
have yet to undertake it. Does the provision of public universities provide a club good to a 
particular constituency or is there something of an urban bias in existence? These are 
interesting questions for further research.  
 
 
5.0 Conclusion 
Internationally, Brazil is renowned for its contrasts: from the beachside hotels of Rio 
de Janeiro to the harsh cramped conditions of the favelas on the hillsides above the 
golden beaches. Behind such extremes lies a history of an unequal society. The large gap 
in incomes within Brazil has remained almost unchanged for at least half a century.124 As 
higher education became less about technological advancement and more about skilled 
labour, its role in income distribution intensified. By identifying the following, this paper 
has demonstrated how the education system between 1987 and 2010 effectively became 
a mechanism which allowed high income inequality to persist: 
Fewer than 35% of UNICAMP students attended only public education. 
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61% of students enrolled had attended a pre-vestibular course. 
Nearly 75% of subscribers will fail to be enrolled at the first time of asking. 
It is estimated that over 60% of students are from families in the 9th and 10th 
income deciles. 
 
The education system allows high income inequality to persist by allocating the best 
educational assets, regressively through state funding, towards high income households,   
thus enabling these households to gain access to employment with high skill premiums. 
Lower income households, meanwhile, are less able to pay for private education; and find 
themselves left with the alternative option of having to pay for their higher education 
privately following a publically funded secondary education. With the design of the 
education system remaining fundamentally the same, there is the prospect of a looping 
effect of public graduates being able to fund their children towards being public 
graduates: thus a self-fulfilling prophecy is created. 
Despite the numerous measures introduced into the education system between 
1987 and 2010 at both federal and individual university level, the problem of unequal 
educational opportunities persists. The beginning of the period observed by this 
dissertation was marked by the re-democratisation of Brazil; but as yet, this has fail to 
cumulate into the higher educational reform needed to remedy the problem of persistent 
income inequality. Instead, Brazil implemented educational expansion publically at 
secondary level, and privately at tertiary levels.  
It is always difficult to dispute the need for public investment in higher education, 
such is its obvious public and societal importance; but the state must ensure that any such 
investment is as egalitarian as possible. Any policy prescription for the expansion of 
education in order to tackle inequalities must pay heed to a nation’s individual structural 
characteristics. The findings presented pose serious questions  regarding the capability of 
public secondary education to  produce students capable of competing for a place in 
public higher education; and above all, suggest a need for what Birdsall and Sze ́kely refer 
to as policies of ‘Bootstraps not Band-Aids’.
125
 The findings also pose a question as to the 
fairness of free public higher education, while the problem of unequal opportunities still 
obtains. 
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Figure 1. G8, LAC6 (Excluding Brazil) & BRICs (Excluding Brazil) Average 
Gini Coefficient as % 1987-2006 
 
Source: See Table 1 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  G8, LAC6 (Excluding Brazil) & BRICs (Excluding Brazil) Average 
% of income share held by the highest decile 1987-2006 
 
Source: See Table 2 
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Figure 3. 1850-1990 Income Distribution in Brazil and Spain: Gini Coefficients 
 
Source: Prados de la Escosura, ‘Growth, Inequality’, p. 39 
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Figure 4. Numbers of Schools by Level of Education 1981-2011 
  
  
Note: Preliminary results. Not all totals will reconcile as some schools are included that do not have a specific administration. 
Sources: See Table 5 
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Figure 5. 1987-2010 Enrolments 
  
  
Note: Though accounting practices over time show inconsistence, a crude picture is still obtainable. 
Sources: See Table 6. 
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Figure 6. 1987-2009 Average Household Monthly Income by Income Decile 
(In R$ Oct-09) 
 
Source: See Table 14. 
 
Figure 7. 1987-2009 Real Monthly Minimum Salary (R$) 
 
Source: See Table 15. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. 1987-2006 G8, LAC6 (Excluding Brazil) & BRICs (Excluding Brazil) Average Gini Coefficient as %  
 
 Year 
Country 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
            
Brazil 59.1 61.0 62.1 60.4 n.a. 56.4 59.1 n.a. 58.2 58.3 
                      
LAC6 (Excluding Brazil) 28.2 33.1 36.9 28.4 36.7 40.9 41.5 42.7 41.1 43.3 
Argentina n.a. n.a. 50.4 n.a. n.a. 52.1 n.a. 53.1 n.a. 52.6 
Chile n.a. 48.7 53.4 n.a. 56.7 50.0 57.6 53.7 56.8 54.5 
Colombia n.a. 25.1 26.7 25.4 31.1 43.0 47.9 44.1 44.5 46.2 
Mexico 31.9 30.0 27.6 31.0 31.5 28.3 31.1 31.2 31.5 31.2 
Venezuela 24.5 28.4 26.6 28.7 27.6 30.9 29.5 31.5 31.6 31.8 
                      
BRICs (Excluding Brazil) 46.1 47.5 48.9 46.5 47.5 45.8 44.5 51.6 50.1 51.7 
China 53.4 54.5 57.0 54.0 55.4 52.0 48.9 55.3 54.5 55.4 
India 41.7 42.5 42.2 41.0 41.3 40.6 40.2 54.5 48.0 52.1 
Russian Federation 43.3 45.4 47.6 44.4 45.9 44.7 44.4 45.2 47.8 47.8 
                      
G8 32.8 33.4 32.8 32.1 32.7 32.7 32.7 34.1 33.3 32.9 
Canada 40.3 40.5 40.9 40.4 39.1 40.7 42.3 40.7 41.8 42.1 
France 34.4 n.a. 32.4 n.a. 30.8 n.a. 35.5 n.a. 35.3 32.3 
Germany n.a. n.a. 31.2 35.0 n.a. 31.1 24.8 n.a. 31.6 n.a. 
Italy 32.4 31.7 31.3 30.4 33.3 32.4 31.5 33.7 32.0 n.a. 
Japan n.a. n.a. 32.7 28.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 32.3 30.2 30.2 
United Kingdom 26.9 30.9 29.0 25.2 25.3 25.7 28.5 29.2 28.7 27.8 
United States 30.0 30.4 32.1 33.5 34.8 33.8 33.6 34.6 33.6 32.3 
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Table 1. Continued  
 Year 
Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
            
Brazil 59.6 59.5 58.5 n.a. 60.0 58.3 57.6 56.6 56.4 n.a. 
                      
LAC6 (Excluding Brazil) 39.7 44.1 41.4 44.0 46.0 43.1 37.1 49.9 47.8 45.1 
Argentina n.a. 53.8 n.a. 54.0 n.a. 51.0 n.a. 49.9 51.0 n.a. 
Chile 60.6 56.2 56.5 56.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. 55.8 n.a. n.a. 
Colombia 37.6 41.0 n.a. 43.7 47.2 40.0 n.a. 46.9 44.5 45.1 
Mexico 32.3 32.8 32.8 33.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Venezuela 28.4 36.7 35.0 32.4 44.8 38.1 37.1 46.9 n.a. n.a. 
                      
BRICs (Excluding Brazil) 49.0 50.7 50.9 50.9 49.3 50.4 51.2 48.1 48.9 48.6 
China n.a. 55.2 56.8 57.4 n.a. n.a. 54.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
India 50.8 47.4 46.8 44.9 46.4 47.5 46.2 45.4 47.6 n.a. 
Russian Federation 47.2 49.4 49.1 50.4 52.2 53.3 52.8 50.8 50.2 48.6 
                      
G8 32.4 33.7 32.9 33.1 32.6 34.4 34.2 34.7 30.3 29.5 
Canada 42.3 45.3 45.5 41.7 46.3 46.2 46.4 46.4 n.a. n.a. 
France 31.7 35.8 30.4 34.6 29.2 35.2 n.a. 33.0 33.0 32.0 
Germany 30.3 31.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Italy 33.6 n.a. 32.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 36.8 n.a. n.a. 
Japan 28.6 29.5 28.2 28.2 27.6 27.0 27.0 28.0 28.0 27.0 
United Kingdom 28.8 27.2 27.3 27.8 27.4 29.6 29.3 29.2 26.0 27.0 
United States 31.9 32.7 34.0 33.1 32.6 34.3 34.0 n.a. 34.0 32.0 
Note: n.a. = no data available 
Source: The United Nations University – World Institute for Development Economics Research World Income Inequality Database (WIID), 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database/
45 
 
Table 2. 1987-2006 G8, LAC6 (Excluding Brazil) & BRICs (Excluding Brazil) Average % of Income 
share held by the highest decile 
 Year 
Country 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
            
Brazil 46.7 48.5 50.1 47.9 n.a. 46.3 48.3 n.a. 48.1 47.8 
            
LAC6 (Excluding Brazil) 37.2 34.2 40.2 37.8 34.8 38.4 40.2 41.3 41.3 41.1 
Argentina 34.0 34.3 35.9 35.3 36.4 34.1 33.1 34.5 37.0 36.4 
Chile 44.4 n.a. 48.9 45.1 n.a. 44.3 41.8 44.5 45.4 45.2 
Colombia n.a. n.a. 41.8 n.a. n.a. 39.9 45.8 42.4 47.0 43.8 
Mexico n.a. n.a. 42.1 n.a. n.a. 42.2 n.a. 43.9 n.a. 42.1 
Venezuela 33.1 34.1 32.2 32.9 33.2 31.7 n.a. n.a. 35.8 37.9 
            
BRICs (Excluding Brazil) n.a. 19.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 34.2 39.5 32.5 32.4 37.6 
China n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 31.7 n.a. 
India n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Russian Federation n.a. 19.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 34.2 39.5 32.5 33.2 37.6 
            
G8 24.1 23.9 24.6 24.8 24.8 24.1 24.2 25.5 24.5 23.7 
Canada 23.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. 23.4 n.a. n.a. 23.7 n.a. n.a. 
France n.a. n.a. 24.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 25.6 23.0 23.0 
Germany 22.8 22.9 23.1 23.5 23.4 22.0 22.3 23.2 22.6 22.1 
Italy 25.8 n.a. 25.2 n.a. 24.1 n.a. 26.2 n.a. 26.2 24.0 
Japan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 21.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
United Kingdom 23.9 25.0 25.1 26.0 26.6 26.2 26.4 27.0 26.2 25.5 
United States n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 26.4 n.a. n.a. 27.9 n.a. n.a. 
 
 
46 
 
 
Table 2. Continued  
 Year 
Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
            
Brazil 47.9 48.2 46.8 n.a. 48.5 46.6 45.7 44.9 45.0 n.a. 
            
LAC6 (Excluding Brazil) 42.8 40.8 43.5 41.3 37.0 38.6 39.7 39.0 37.9 35.9 
Argentina 35.7 37.5 36.8 37.4 39.0 40.3 39.8 38.2 37.7 35.9 
Chile n.a. 44.7 48.3 47.5 n.a. n.a. 45.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Colombia 55.4 44.0 45.3 45.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 44.7 n.a. n.a. 
Mexico n.a. 42.1 n.a. 42.7 n.a. 39.8 n.a. 39.2 40.3 n.a. 
Venezuela 37.5 35.5 n.a. 33.3 35.0 35.6 34.4 33.9 35.7 n.a. 
            
BRICs (Excluding Brazil) n.a. 34.6 28.9 33.5 33.1 26.2 n.a. 33.0 n.a. n.a. 
China n.a. 30.4 n.a. n.a. 33.1 28.6 n.a. 34.9 n.a. n.a. 
India n.a. n.a. 28.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 31.1 n.a. n.a. 
Russian Federation n.a. 38.7 n.a. 33.5 n.a. 23.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
            
G8 24.5 24.3 23.8 25.1 23.0 25.7 23.0 22.8 n.a. n.a. 
Canada 23.9 25.0 n.a. 24.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
France 23.0 22.0 24.0 22.0 22.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Germany 22.2 21.8 21.8 22.3 21.9 23.0 23.0 22.8 n.a. n.a. 
Italy 23.0 26.8 23.0 25.6 22.0 26.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Japan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
United Kingdom 24.9 25.7 26.5 26.4 25.9 27.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
United States 30.2 n.a. n.a. 29.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Note: n.a. = no data available 
Source: The United Nations University – World Institute for Development Economics Research World Income Inequality Database (WIID), 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database/ 
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Table 5. Number of Schools by Level of Education 1981-2011 
Year Level Federal State Municipal Public 
Schools 
Private 
Schools 
Total 
1981 
Pré-Escola 125 5,749 4,785 10,385 7,369 18,028 
Ensino 
Fundamental 666 53,598 128,572 182,589 9,793 192,629 
Ensino Médio 119 3,220 549 3,888 4,031 7,930 
Ensino 
Superior 58 80 111 249 614 863 
1985 
Pré-Escola n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Ensino 
Fundamental 
630 53,775 122,481 176,885 10,370 187,274 
Ensino Médio 137 4,421 638 5,196 4,064 9,260 
Ensino 
Superior 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1987 
Pré-Escola n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Ensino 
Fundamental 760 n.a. n.a. 181,804 11,084 192,888 
Ensino Médio 138 n.a. n.a. 6,247 3,893 10,140 
Ensino 
Superior 54 83 103 240 613 853 
1991 
Pré-Escola 232 14,784 29,540 44,556 12,311 56,867 
Ensino 
Fundamental 443 46,683 134,767 181,893 11,927 193,820 
Ensino Médio 124 6,730 828 7,682 3,909 11,591 
Ensino 
Superior n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1996 
Pré-Escola 56 13,271 47,602 60,929 16,811 77,740 
Ensino 
Fundamental 156 47,248 132,549 179,953 15,814 195,767 
Ensino Médio 137 9,038 1,167 10,342 4,871 15,213 
Ensino 
Superior n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
 
48 
 
Table 5 Continued 
Year Level Federal State Municipal Public 
Schools 
Private 
Schools 
Total 
2000 
Pré-Escola 14 6,586 52,455 59,055 22,698 84,617 
Ensino 
Fundamental 47 33,678 129,643 163,368 18,136 181,504 
Ensino Médio 164 11,977 1,086 13,227 6,229 19,456 
Ensino 
Superior 61 61 54 176 1,004 1,180 
2001 
Pré-Escola 19 5,522 60,070 65,611 25,071 90,682 
Ensino 
Fundamental 
48 32,938 126,242 159,228 18,552 177,780 
Ensino Médio 162 12,807 947 13,916 6,304 20,220 
Ensino 
Superior 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2002 
Pré-Escola 17 5,347 61,667 67,031 25,656 92,687 
Ensino 
Fundamental 44 32,316 121,336 153,696 18,812 172,508 
Ensino Médio 165 13,758 848 14,771 6,533 21,304 
Ensino 
Superior 67 63 53 183 1,208 1,391 
2006 
Pré-Escola 17 4,190 76,579 80,786 26,589 107,375 
Ensino 
Fundamental 41 29,016 110,782 139,839 19,177 159,016 
Ensino Médio 162 16,078 832 17,072 7,059 24,131 
Ensino 
Superior 105 83 60 248 2,022 2,270 
2011 
Pré-Escola 19 1,186 79,094 80,299 25,993 106,292 
Ensino 
Fundamental 46 26,595 98,440 125,081 21,160 146,241 
Ensino Médio 328 18,381 444 19,153 7,791 26,944 
Ensino 
Superior 99 108 71 278 2,100 2,378 
 
Note: Preliminary results. Not all totals will reconcile as some schools are included that do not have 
a specific administration. N.a. if no data available. 
Source: Ministério da Educação e Cultura in Anuário Estatístico do Brasil 1982-2011 
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Table 6. 1987-2010 Enrolments 
 Level of Education 
 Pré-Escola Ensino Fundamental 
  Total   Public   Private   Total   Public   Private  
1987 n.a. n.a. n.a. 26,708,308 23,323,394 3,384,914 
1988 n.a. n.a. n.a. 26,754,501 23,387,383 3,367,118 
1989 3,396,074 2,355,151 1,040,923 27,557,542 24,114,558 3,442,984 
1990 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1991 3,605,511 2,568,882 1,036,629 28,948,266 25,354,119 3,594,147 
1992 3,795,217 2,780,957 1,014,260 29,992,140 26,479,572 3,512,568 
1993 4,085,978 3,055,030 1,030,948 30,520,748 27,030,680 3,490,068 
1994 5,686,762 4,355,285 1,331,477 31,101,662 27,518,600 3,583,062 
1995 5,749,237 4,366,860 1,382,377 32,668,738 28,870,159 3,798,579 
1996 4,270,376 3,250,889 1,019,487 33,131,270 29,423,373 3,707,897 
1997 4,292,208 3,304,776 987,432 34,229,388 30,565,641 3,663,747 
1998 4,111,120 3,123,496 987,624 35,792,554 32,409,205 3,383,349 
1999 4,235,278 3,180,447 1,054,831 36,059,742 32,782,395 3,277,347 
2000 4,421,332 3,332,173 1,089,159 35,717,948 32,528,707 3,189,241 
2001 4,818,803 3,594,896 1,223,907 35,298,089 32,089,803 3,208,286 
2002 4,977,847 3,706,894 1,270,953 35,150,362 31,915,585 3,234,777 
2003 5,155,676 3,837,092 1,318,584 34,438,749 31,162,624 3,276,125 
2004 5,555,525 4,071,879 1,483,646 34,012,434 30,680,954 3,331,480 
2005 5,790,670 4,277,350 1,513,320 33,534,561 30,157,792 3,376,769 
2006 5,588,153 4,148,226 1,439,927 33,282,663 29,814,686 3,467,977 
2007 4,930,287 3,898,095 1,032,192 32,122,273 28,928,605 3,193,668 
2008 4,967,525 3,849,829 1,117,696 32,086,700 28,468,696 3,618,004 
2009 4,866,268 3,735,751 1,130,517 31,705,528 27,927,139 3,778,389 
2010 4,692,045 3,573,764 1,118,281 31,005,341 27,064,103 3,941,238 
 
 
 
50 
 
 
 
Table 6 Continued 
 Level of Education 
 Ensino Médio Ensino Superior 
  Total   Public   Private   Total   Public   Private  
1987 3,206,207 2,080,263 1,125,113 1,470,555 584,965 885,590 
1988 3,368,150 2,283,585 1,084,565 1,503,560 585,351 918,209 
1989 3,477,859 2,419,390 1,058,469 1,518,904 584,414 934,490 
1990 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,540,080 578,625 961,455 
1991 3,725,133 2,702,521 1,022,612 1,565,056 605,736 959,320 
1992 3,986,653 3,008,240 978,413 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1993 4,206,766 3,219,699 987,067 1,594,668 653,516 941,152 
1994 4,510,199 3,471,101 1,039,098 1,661,034 690,450 970,584 
1995 5,371,837 4,209,048 1,162,789 1,759,703 700,540 1,059,163 
1996 5,739,077 4,562,558 1,176,519 1,868,529 735,427 1,133,102 
1997 6,405,057 5,137,992 1,267,065 1,945,615 759,182 1,186,433 
1998 6,968,531 5,741,890 1,226,641 2,125,958 804,729 1,321,229 
1999 7,769,199 6,544,835 1,224,364 2,369,945 832,022 1,537,923 
2000 8,192,948 7,039,529 1,153,419 2,694,245 887,026 1,807,219 
2001 8,398,008 7,283,528 1,114,480 3,030,754 939,225 2,091,529 
2002 8,710,584 7,587,684 1,122,900 3,479,913 1,051,655 2,428,258 
2003 9,072,942 7,945,425 1,127,517 3,887,022 1,136,370 2,750,652 
2004 9,169,357 8,057,966 1,111,391 4,163,733 1,178,328 2,985,405 
2005 9,031,302 7,933,713 1,097,589 4,453,156 1,192,189 3,260,967 
2006 8,906,820 7,838,086 1,068,734 4,676,646 1,209,304 3,467,342 
2007 8,369,369 7,472,301 897,068 4,880,381 1,240,968 3,639,413 
2008 8,366,100 7,395,577 970,523 5,080,056 1,273,965 3,806,091 
2009 8,337,160 7,364,153 973,007 5,115,896 1,351,168 3,764,728 
2010 8,357,675 7,369,837 987,838 5,449,120 1,461,696 3,987,424 
 
 Note: Counting practices were not perfectly consistent over time; however a crude picture is still possible. n.a. = no data available 
Source: MEC in Anuário Estatístico do Brasil 1987-2000 and INEP, http://portal.inep.gov.br/basica-censo-escolar-sinopse-sinopse
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Table 7. Nominal Revenue Collected by all levels of government 1987-2009 
  Revenue Collected 
          
Year Union States and Federal District Municipalities Total 
          
  Thousands of cruzados (Cz$ 1.000) 
1987 1,692,405,901 1,172,820,151 391,818,390 3,257,044,442 
1988 15,949,586,311 8,041,262,637 1,645,278,441 25,636,127,389 
  
  Thousands of cruzados novos(NCz$ 1.000) 
1989 547,059,356 132,687,508 30,168,058 709,914,922 
  
  Thousands of cruzeiros (Cr$ 1.000) 
1990 21,649,721,712 3,930,498,551 1,049,760,825 26,629,981,088 
1991 46,073,797,067 18,385,568,857 5,357,949,550 69,817,315,474 
1992 659,074,785,624 205,686,345,041 54,469,349,163 919,230,479,828 
  
  Thousands of cruzeiros reais (CR$ 1.000) 
1993 22,358,761,287 4,591,940,563 2,000,185,675 28,950,887,525 
  
  Thousands of reais (R$ 1.000) 
1994 181,526,857 41,677,303 17,969,446 241,173,606 
1995 316,217,098 79,193,000 38,677,693 434,087,791 
1996 298,924,763 99,947,000 45,153,547 444,025,310 
1997 415,189,033 173,609,107 49,625,521 638,423,661 
1998 508,675,217 135,630,781 50,617,609 694,923,607 
1999 606,416,121 151,084,000 55,024,099 812,524,220 
2000 651,023,201 152,392,939 78,912,200 882,328,340 
2001 608,097,063 167,773,406 71,900,818 847,771,287 
2002 721,922,609 181,813,982 86,411,336 990,147,927 
2003 918,530,285 209,277,990 112,067,357 1,239,875,632 
2004 931,525,697 239,470,809 118,689,185 1,289,685,691 
2005 1,161,168,757 275,734,744 123,190,655 1,560,094,156 
2006 1,181,809,271 305,424,854 150,572,831 1,637,806,956 
2007 1,243,544,911 343,257,672 193,795,495 1,780,598,078 
2008 1,215,777,790 416,947,419 228,066,038 1,860,791,247 
2009 1,515,505,211 444,649,959 248,669,478 2,208,824,648 
Note: It is important to note here that the table cannot be used to identify rapid increases in revenues, as 
Brazil suffered from high inflation throughout the 1980s and early 1990s: until the Plano Real was put in 
place and the table is merely for proportional purposes.126  
Source: Estatístico do Seculo XX, 
http://www.ibge.gov.br/seculoxx/economia/financas_publicas/financas_publicas.shtm and INEP, 
http://portal.inep.gov.br/estatisticas-gastoseducacao-receita_total-receita_federal 
                                                          
126 Paiva Abreu and Werneck, ‘The Brazilian Economy’, p.431. 
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Table 11. Population by age groups (current population and resident) 1991-
2010 
  Year 
        
Age Cohort 1991 2000 2010 
        
Total 146,825,475  
                
169,799,170  
                 
190,755,799  
        
0 to 4 years 
                   
16,521,114  
                  
16,375,728  
                   
13,796,159  
5 to 9 years 
                   
17,420,159  
                  
16,542,327  
                   
14,969,375  
10 to 14 years 
                   
17,047,159  
                  
17,348,067  
                   
17,166,761  
15 to 19 years 
                   
15,017,472  
                  
17,939,815  
                   
16,990,870  
20 to 24 years 
                   
13,564,878  
                  
16,141,515  
                   
17,245,190  
25 to 29 years 
                   
12,638,078  
                  
13,849,665  
                   
17,104,413  
30 to 39 years 
                   
20,527,256  
                  
25,290,473  
                   
29,633,093  
40 to 49 years 
                   
13,959,402  
                  
19,268,235  
                   
24,842,718  
50 to 59 years 
                     
9,407,252  
                  
12,507,316  
                   
18,416,621  
60 to 69 years 
                     
6,412,918  
                    
8,182,035  
                   
11,349,929  
70 years or more 
                     
4,309,787  
                    
6,353,994  
                     
9,240,670  
        
0 to 19 years 
                   
66,005,904  
                  
68,205,937  
                   
62,923,165  
20 to 50 years 
                   
70,096,866  
                  
87,057,204  
                 
107,242,035  
20 + years 
                   
80,819,571  
                
101,593,233  
                 
127,832,634  
50 + years 
                   
20,129,957  
                  
27,043,345  
                   
39,007,220  
 
Source: Directorate General of Statistics, [187?] - 1930 Census of Brazil 1872-1920; IBGE Census 
1940-2010. Until 1991, data extracted from: Statistics of the twentieth century. Rio de Janeiro: 
IBGE, 2007 Statistical Yearbook of Brazil in 1994. Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, vol.54, 1994. In 
http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/  
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Table 12. Present and Resident Population, by Region and State, Level of 
Urbanization 1991-2010 (%) 
    Year 
    1991 2000 2010 
       
Urbanisation   75.47 81.23 84.36 
       
North   7 7.6 8.3 
North East   28.9 28.1 27.8 
South East   42.7 42.6 42.1 
South   15.1 14.8 14.4 
Central West   6.4 6.9 7.4 
       
Rondonia   0.8 0.8 0.8 
Acre   0.3 0.3 0.4 
Amazonas   1.4 1.7 1.8 
Roraima   0.2 0.2 0.2 
Para   3.5 3.7 4 
Amapa   0.2 0.3 0.4 
Tocantins   0.6 0.7 0.7 
Maranhao   3.4 3.3 3.5 
Piaui   1.8 1.7 1.6 
Ceara   4.3 4.4 4.4 
Rio Grande do Norte   1.6 1.6 1.7 
Paraiba   2.2 2 2 
Pernambuco   4.9 4.7 4.6 
Alagoas   1.7 1.7 1.6 
Sergipe   1 1.1 1.1 
Bahia   8.1 7.7 7.4 
Minas Gerais   10.7 10.5 10.3 
Espirito Santo   1.8 1.8 1.8 
Rio de Janeiro   8.7 8.5 8.4 
Sao Paulo   21.5 21.8 21.6 
Parana   5.8 5.6 5.5 
Santa Catarina   3.1 3.2 3.3 
Rio Grande do Sul   6.2 6 5.6 
Mato Grosso do Sul   1.2 1.2 1.3 
Mato Grosso   1.4 1.5 1.6 
Goias   2.7 3 3.2 
Source: IBGE, Directorate General of Statistics, [187?] / 1930, Census of Brazil 1872/1920, IBGE, 
Demographic Census 1940/2010. Until 1991, data extracted from: Statistics of the twentieth 
century. Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 2007 Statistical Yearbook of Brazil in 1994. Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, vol. 
54, 1994. IBGE, Demographic Census 1950/2010. Until 1991, data from Statistics of the twentieth 
century, Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, in 2007 Brazil's Statistical Yearbook, 1993, vol 53, 1993. In 
http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/  
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Table 13. Present and Resident Population, by colour or race 1991-2010 (%) 
  Year 
Race  1991 2000 
    
White  51.56 53.74 
Black  5 6.21 
Brown  42.45 38.45 
Yellow  0.43 0.45 
Indigenous  0.2 0.4 
 
Source: IBGE, Demographic Census. Data from: Population trends: an analysis of sample results 
from the 2000 census. Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 2004: pp 25/26, Figure 2. In 
http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/ 
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Table 14. 1987-2009 Average Household Monthly Income by Income Decile (In R$ Oct-09) 
Year Average monthly income of the population Decile 
    1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 
1987 529.02 40.59 84.20 124.66 169.88 227.16 299.25 400.42 553.55 864.62 2525.85 
1988 490.77 33.78 72.88 108.13 148.54 199.04 265.25 356.17 499.61 796.55 2427.73 
1989 562.94 36.20 77.16 114.60 158.50 211.61 284.98 385.74 554.75 906.91 2898.96 
1990 510.97 34.84 74.60 112.56 154.70 208.50 277.45 376.24 531.40 846.64 2492.80 
1992 443.80 29.74 74.80 113.27 157.12 206.70 270.75 352.22 476.27 725.45 2031.69 
1993 467.62 30.80 74.84 113.01 154.18 202.99 264.73 344.66 474.51 742.02 2274.45 
1995 579.92 40.78 93.43 138.79 190.25 252.70 325.61 432.25 603.50 946.78 2775.16 
1996 591.28 37.05 90.77 138.24 192.17 256.64 332.80 447.58 626.74 981.02 2809.80 
1997 590.65 38.41 91.99 138.65 191.06 255.70 332.13 446.82 624.19 972.10 2815.47 
1998 596.81 41.98 95.71 143.45 195.89 259.55 335.70 448.04 622.27 973.04 2852.42 
1999 563.49 41.60 93.95 139.11 189.61 250.99 321.38 424.24 589.36 921.27 2663.42 
2001 571.31 38.66 93.74 140.38 191.84 254.11 331.12 430.15 596.45 925.76 2710.95 
2002 571.62 44.85 99.41 144.67 195.45 257.16 334.27 432.59 597.93 921.44 2688.39 
2003 538.21 41.27 94.92 139.32 188.86 247.28 322.75 414.56 571.14 875.00 2487.06 
2004 550.84 47.39 104.00 150.04 200.21 260.65 337.49 430.79 588.16 892.66 2497.06 
2005 583.96 52.39 112.81 161.46 214.95 279.29 361.46 458.89 620.01 931.42 2646.91 
2006 638.29 59.00 127.30 182.33 242.30 311.74 399.13 505.95 678.40 1019.99 2856.76 
2007 655.83 57.46 132.34 190.75 254.58 330.41 424.69 531.91 708.67 1050.29 2877.23 
2008 689.61 66.26 145.09 209.03 275.81 355.33 452.94 562.54 747.42 1099.55 2982.17 
2009 705.72 67.56 150.54 217.79 288.24 369.34 470.14 583.03 769.20 1123.26 3018.08 
Note: Series calculated from the responses to the National Survey by Household Sampling (PNAD / IBGE). 
Source: Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA), in http://www.ipeadata.gov.br/  
56 
 
Table 15. 1987-2011 Real Monthly Minimum Salary (R$) 
Month Minimum 
Salary 
Month Minimum 
Salary 
Month Minimum 
Salary 
Month Minimum 
Salary 
1987.01 441 1990.07 299 1994.01 373 1997.07 304 
1987.02 387 1990.08 283 1994.02 346 1997.08 305 
1987.03 480 1990.09 288 1994.03 284 1997.09 304 
1987.04 397 1990.1 267 1994.04 283 1997.1 303 
1987.05 386 1990.11 296 1994.05 285 1997.11 303 
1987.06 382 1990.12 264 1994.06 276 1997.12 301 
1987.07 348 1991.01 304 1994.07 251 1998.01 299 
1987.08 331 1991.02 326 1994.08 247 1998.02 297 
1987.09 376 1991.03 312 1994.09 263 1998.03 296 
1987.1 373 1991.04 297 1994.1 255 1998.04 294 
1987.11 369 1991.05 279 1994.11 248 1998.05 316 
1987.12 389 1991.06 251 1994.12 244 1998.06 316 
1988.01 408 1991.07 224 1995.01 241 1998.07 317 
1988.02 414 1991.08 194 1995.02 238 1998.08 318 
1988.03 414 1991.09 414 1995.03 234 1998.09 319 
1988.04 407 1991.1 342 1995.04 229 1998.1 319 
1988.05 413 1991.11 271 1995.05 320 1998.11 320 
1988.06 402 1991.12 218 1995.06 313 1998.12 318 
1988.07 392 1992.01 396 1995.07 306 1999.01 316 
1988.08 406 1992.02 318 1995.08 302 1999.02 312 
1988.09 390 1992.03 261 1995.09 299 1999.03 308 
1988.1 385 1992.04 216 1995.1 295 1999.04 307 
1988.11 391 1992.05 416 1995.11 290 1999.05 321 
1988.12 399 1992.06 344 1995.12 286 1999.06 321 
1989.01 396 1992.07 282 1996.01 282 1999.07 318 
1989.02 400 1992.08 230 1996.02 280 1999.08 317 
1989.03 378 1992.09 422 1996.03 279 1999.09 315 
1989.04 350 1992.1 335 1996.04 276 1999.1 312 
1989.05 382 1992.11 272 1996.05 306 1999.11 309 
1989.06 435 1992.12 217 1996.06 301 1999.12 307 
1989.07 426 1993.01 403 1996.07 298 2000.01 305 
1989.08 412 1993.02 323 1996.08 296 2000.02 305 
1989.09 391 1993.03 346 1996.09 296 2000.03 305 
1989.1 431 1993.04 270 1996.1 295 2000.04 338 
1989.11 424 1993.05 411 1996.11 294 2000.05 338 
1989.12 396 1993.06 315 1996.12 293 2000.06 337 
1990.01 384 1993.07 338 1997.01 291 2000.07 333 
1990.02 344 1993.08 303 1997.02 290 2000.08 329 
1990.03 347 1993.09 387 1997.03 288 2000.09 327 
1990.04 302 1993.1 361 1997.04 286 2000.1 327 
1990.05 282 1993.11 332 1997.05 306 2000.11 326 
1990.06 265 1993.12 301 1997.06 305 2000.12 324 
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Table 15. Continued 
Month Minimum 
Salary 
Month Minimum 
Salary 
Month Minimum 
Salary 
2001.01 321 2004.03 365 2007.05 504 
2001.02 320 2004.04 363 2007.06 502 
2001.03 318 2004.05 392 2007.07 500 
2001.04 376 2004.06 390 2007.08 498 
2001.05 374 2004.07 387 2007.09 496 
2001.06 372 2004.08 385 2007.1 495 
2001.07 368 2004.09 385 2007.11 493 
2001.08 365 2004.1 384 2007.12 488 
2001.09 363 2004.11 382 2008.01 485 
2001.1 360 2004.12 379 2008.02 482 
2001.11 355 2005.01 377 2008.03 524 
2001.12 353 2005.02 375 2008.04 521 
2002.01 349 2005.03 373 2008.05 516 
2002.02 348 2005.04 369 2008.06 511 
2002.03 346 2005.05 423 2008.07 508 
2002.04 382 2005.06 424 2008.08 507 
2002.05 381 2005.07 423 2008.09 506 
2002.06 379 2005.08 423 2008.1 504 
2002.07 375 2005.09 423 2008.11 502 
2002.08 372 2005.1 420 2008.12 500 
2002.09 369 2005.11 418 2009.01 497 
2002.1 363 2005.12 416 2009.01 497 
2002.11 351 2006.01 415 2009.02 555 
2002.12 342 2006.02 414 2009.03 554 
2003.01 333 2006.03 413 2009.04 551 
2003.02 329 2006.04 481 2009.05 548 
2003.03 324 2006.05 480 2009.06 546 
2003.04 384 2006.06 481 2009.07 544 
2003.05 380 2006.07 480 2009.08 544 
2003.06 380 2006.08 480 2009.09 543 
2003.07 380 2006.09 480 2009.1 542 
2003.08 379 2006.1 478 2009.11 540 
2003.09 376 2006.11 476 2009.12 539 
2003.1 375 2006.12 473 2010.01 586 
2003.11 373 2007.01 470 2010.02 581 
2003.12 371 2007.02 468 2010.03 577 
2004.01 368 2007.03 466   
2004.02 367 2007.04 505   
Note: Series in reais (R $) appearing in the last month, established by the IPEA, by deflating the 
nominal wage index by the National Consumer Price Index (INPC) of IBGE in March 1979. For prior 
periods, the deflators used were IGPC-Mtb (jan/1948-mar/1979), the IPC-RJ/FGV (jan/1944-
jan/1948) and IPC-SP/Fipe (jul/1940-jan / 1944). 
Source: Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA), in http://www.ipeadata.gov.br/ 
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Table 15. 1987-2010 Age of Subscribers 
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Blank 2 2521 n.a. 125 104 176 194 279 453 564 446 390 
Under 16 
years 72 5 n.a. 185 168 324 272 272 246 184 138 162 
16 years 930 123 n.a. 1971 2052 2969 2512 3039 2537 1965 1764 1740 
17 years 2778 1667 n.a. 10696 10209 11747 11287 13379 12288 10499 10266 10762 
18 years 2963 8259 n.a. 9772 9678 9369 8921 11502 10872 9186 8839 9251 
19 years 2179 7680 n.a. 5571 5885 5286 4825 6575 6264 4935 4657 4877 
20 years 1461 4850 n.a. 2881 3007 2938 2521 3325 3241 2512 2341 2400 
21 to 23 
years 1875 5372 n.a. 2994 2909 2932 2695 3549 3129 2420 2143 2268 
24 to 29 
years 
793 1582 n.a. 1134 1198 1369 1142 1518 1194 852 883 975 
More than 
29 years 
207 333 n.a. 343 358 512 466 587 514 393 474 502 
Total 13260 32392 n.a. 35672 35568 37622 34835 44025 40738 33510 31951 33327 
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Table 15. Continued 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Blank 263 448 273 269 316 919 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Under 16 
years 140 201 153 205 207 215 101 69 22 34 49 56 
16 years 1832 2089 2235 2537 2656 2839 1849 1573 721 822 896 1128 
17 years 12200 12776 13375 13220 13153 14658 13091 12331 7229 7243 7551 8736 
18 years 10719 12154 12559 12714 11935 12854 14563 13692 16126 16508 16768 18884 
19 years 5662 6624 7287 7941 7124 7111 9447 8552 10970 10710 10729 12245 
20 years 2886 3316 3634 3924 4053 4006 4801 4694 5666 5400 5308 5881 
21 to 23 
years 2634 3318 3530 3972 4341 4684 5813 5059 5723 5231 4969 5320 
24 to 29 
years 
1223 1412 1523 1638 1825 2146 2732 2491 2570 2421 2070 2266 
More than 
29 years 
587 762 746 845 882 1117 1378 1145 1192 1108 982 968 
Total 38146 43100 45315 47265 46492 50549 53775 49606 50219 49477 49322 55484 
Note: N.a. if no data available. 
Source: Comissão Permanente para os Vestibulares (COMVEST). ‘Perfil socioeconômico’, http://www.comvest.unicamp.br/estatisticas/perfil/perfil.html 
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Table 16. 1987-2010 Age of Subscribers Enrolled 
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Blank 0 320 n.a. 7 2 8 10 9 14 25 18 17 
Under 16 
years 0 0 n.a. 2 0 6 0 1 3 2 2 2 
16 years 18 0 n.a. 24 25 77 65 49 43 41 51 33 
17 years 320 19 n.a. 481 465 511 561 563 527 471 530 695 
18 years 333 293 n.a. 432 420 470 513 528 502 454 493 595 
19 years 233 343 n.a. 222 265 248 244 283 330 290 263 303 
20 years 134 188 n.a. 108 140 152 156 165 158 166 135 156 
21 to 23 
years 150 221 n.a. 156 152 165 203 177 185 178 183 195 
24 to 29 
years 
50 90 n.a. 81 109 118 118 112 98 98 74 125 
More than 
29 years 
10 30 n.a. 24 34 45 62 45 34 46 40 79 
Total 1248 1504 n.a. 1537 1612 1800 1932 1932 1894 1771 1789 2200 
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Table 16. Continued 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Blank 9 14 14 9 14 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Under 16 
years 4 5 2 2 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
16 years 55 48 55 45 43 62 8 8 1 3 6 5 
17 years 667 633 720 633 703 820 567 596 271 283 354 383 
18 years 660 773 700 792 810 875 908 875 914 889 1154 1103 
19 years 359 450 431 511 487 461 572 593 757 770 843 895 
20 years 186 227 231 233 294 243 312 327 375 381 426 440 
21 to 23 
years 237 213 245 259 314 263 404 333 421 390 475 387 
24 to 29 
years 129 125 111 135 138 131 164 224 233 234 237 227 
More than 
29 years 89 68 58 60 70 72 58 77 89 82 80 96 
Total 2395 2556 2567 2679 2877 2971 2994 3033 3061 3032 3575 3536 
Note: N.a. if no data available. 
Source: Comissão Permanente para os Vestibulares (COMVEST). ‘Perfil socioeconômico’, http://www.comvest.unicamp.br/estatisticas/perfil/perfil.html   
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Table 17. 1987-2010 Subscribers Type of Ensino Fundamental 
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Blank 70 927 581 209 222 160 182 271 439 517 389 362 
Only private 2961 8779 9966 12278 12747 14229 13939 17718 17444 15583 15464 16494 
Only public 7326 15644 14005 15522 14883 15032 13042 16376 14194 10594 9741 9955 
Mixed, more time in a 
public 
1531 3656 3050 3883 3570 3870 3570 4347 3730 2685 2376 2442 
Mixed more time on private 
establishment 1259 3147 3094 3466 3068 3213 2975 3869 3776 3212 3079 3232 
Mixed in equal time interval n.a. n.a. 236 314 899 947 939 1132 982 773 753 709 
None of the above 113 239 0 0 179 171 188 312 173 146 149 133 
Total 13260 32392 30932 35672 35568 37622 34835 44025 40738 33510 31951 33327 
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Table 17. Continued 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Blank 271 468 264 286 335 980 1834 1982 1983 1795 1653 1555 
Only private 18871 20653 21711 22800 21963 23527 24269 23443 25221 25988 27904 32350 
Only public 11453 13720 15001 15846 15941 17730 19683 16777 15543 14635 12822 13685 
Mixed, more time in a 
public 2866 3565 3768 3695 3398 3386 3308 3039 2845 2554 2429 2611 
Mixed more time on private 
establishment 3535 3484 3425 3501 3574 3618 3317 3066 3187 3080 3102 3714 
Mixed in equal time interval 986 1028 999 977 1131 1156 1160 1085 1288 1289 1291 1412 
None of the above 164 182 147 160 150 152 204 214 152 136 121 157 
Total 38146 43100 45315 47265 46492 50549 53775 49606 50219 49477 49322 55484 
 
Note: N.a. if no data available. 
Source: Comissão Permanente para os Vestibulares (COMVEST). ‘Perfil socioeconômico’, http://www.comvest.unicamp.br/estatisticas/perfil/perfil.html   
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Table 18. 1987-2010 Subscribers Enrolled, Type of Ensino Fundamental 
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Blank 2 37 20 4 9 6 9 10 15 24 16 17 
Only private 430 466 536 627 678 806 778 839 880 794 902 1073 
Only public 508 660 587 561 590 620 731 660 635 585 504 683 
Mixed, more time in a 
public 
156 169 128 161 141 148 171 180 161 141 134 159 
Mixed more time on private 
establishment 140 160 149 168 137 156 170 171 164 165 172 207 
Mixed in equal time interval n.a. n.a. 8 16 43 56 69 57 34 50 50 50 
None of the above 12 12 0 0 14 8 4 15 5 12 11 11 
Total 1248 1504 1428 1537 1612 1800 1932 1932 1894 1771 1789 2200 
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Table 18. Continued 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Blank 12 17 16 10 13 45 83 106 88 108 103 97 
Only private 1199 1274 1342 1349 1453 1581 1492 1514 1597 1627 2084 2043 
Only public 695 753 755 792 831 804 975 883 889 807 869 850 
Mixed, more time in a 
public 
166 200 210 223 237 211 161 211 186 169 175 174 
Mixed more time on private 
establishment 247 238 193 230 236 241 182 209 191 204 217 245 
Mixed in equal time interval 63 63 45 68 99 78 87 92 99 103 115 116 
None of the above 13 11 6 7 8 11 14 18 11 14 12 11 
Total 2395 2556 2567 2679 2877 2971 2994 3033 3061 3032 3575 3536 
 
Note: N.a. if no data available. 
Source: Comissão Permanente para os Vestibulares (COMVEST). ‘Perfil socioeconômico’, http://www.comvest.unicamp.br/estatisticas/perfil/perfil.html 
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Table 19. 1987-2010 Subscribers Type of Ensino Médio 
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Blank 81 950 611 248 251 196 218 314 477 551 410 391 
Only private 5916 16333 17317 21134 21360 22613 21305 26021 24096 20409 19913 21373 
Only public 5227 10447 8681 9437 9303 10196 9418 12716 11571 8999 8632 8797 
Mixed, more time in a 
public 
1091 2520 2223 2423 2284 2035 1675 2218 2179 1598 1257 1137 
Mixed more time on 
private establishment 821 1904 1913 2128 2128 2263 1917 2349 2097 1715 1526 1378 
Mixed in equal time 
interval n.a. n.a. 186 302 242 319 302 407 318 238 213 251 
None of the above 124 238 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 13260 32392 30932 35672 35568 37622 34835 44025 40738 33510 31951 33327 
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Table 19. Continued 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Blank 265 481 279 305 357 1018 1883 1997 2004 1826 1680 1581 
Only private 24704 26875 28056 29151 28463 30414 30574 29395 31039 30752 32513 37459 
Only public 10108 12528 13720 14526 14362 15854 18339 15534 14630 14705 13013 14107 
Mixed, more time in a 
public 
1264 1362 1468 1445 1420 1410 1249 1093 989 823 763 826 
Mixed more time on 
private establishment 1362 1506 1473 1467 1541 1561 1325 1271 1332 1207 1188 1319 
Mixed in equal time 
interval 187 169 160 173 163 143 138 112 103 96 109 123 
None of the above 256 179 159 198 186 149 267 204 122 68 56 69 
Total 38146 43100 45315 47265 46492 50549 53775 49606 50219 49477 49322 55484 
 
Note: N.a. if no data available. 
Source: Comissão Permanente para os Vestibulares (COMVEST). ‘Perfil socioeconômico’, http://www.comvest.unicamp.br/estatisticas/perfil/perfil.html 
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Table 20. 1987-2010 Subscribers Enrolled, Type of Ensino Médio 
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Blank 2 34 22 4 11 9 11 12 16 24 17 18 
Only private 727 777 805 929 985 1113 1120 1177 1146 1032 1116 1396 
Only public 360 499 442 433 430 502 609 554 554 531 486 621 
Mixed, more time in a 
public 
102 106 71 87 93 70 90 79 69 69 75 66 
Mixed more time on private 
establishment 54 75 76 70 78 95 88 96 91 97 83 80 
Mixed in equal time interval n.a. n.a. 12 14 15 11 14 14 18 18 12 19 
None of the above 3 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 1248 1504 1428 1537 1612 1800 1932 1932 1894 1771 1789 2200 
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Table 20. Continued 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Blank 12 18 15 11 15 45 84 105 90 110 102 99 
Only private 1199 1596 1641 1674 1836 1940 1786 1796 1843 1823 2268 2272 
Only public 695 785 743 820 854 831 1021 971 991 994 1060 1030 
Mixed, more time in a 
public 
166 64 73 73 66 57 33 65 48 42 53 53 
Mixed more time on private 
establishment 247 75 84 88 83 81 55 73 72 56 77 69 
Mixed in equal time interval 63 7 7 6 10 12 4 10 6 4 9 10 
None of the above 13 11 4 7 13 5 11 13 11 3 6 3 
Total 2395 2556 2567 2679 2877 2971 2994 3033 3061 3032 3575 3536 
 
Note: N.a. if no data available. 
Source: Comissão Permanente para os Vestibulares (COMVEST). ‘Perfil socioeconômico’, http://www.comvest.unicamp.br/estatisticas/perfil/perfil.html 
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Table 21. 1987-2010 Subscribers and Enrolled, Attending Pre-University 
Preparatory Courses 
 
 Subscribers Enrolled 
 
Blank Yes No Total Blank Yes No Total 
1987 121 6601 6538 13260 4 780 464 1248 
1988 1070 18038 13284 32392 42 863 599 1504 
1989 749 16302 13881 30932 28 754 646 1428 
1990 467 19329 15876 35672 14 829 694 1537 
1991 415 18892 16261 35568 15 892 705 1612 
1992 344 19931 17347 37622 19 1007 774 1800 
1993 304 18497 16034 34835 18 1051 863 1932 
1994 410 24013 19602 44025 14 1155 763 1932 
1995 615 23161 16962 40738 15 1164 715 1894 
1996 663 19278 13569 33510 31 1051 689 1771 
1997 493 18367 13091 31951 26 1089 674 1789 
1998 502 19148 13677 33327 31 1309 860 2200 
1999 339 22638 15169 38146 15 1448 932 2395 
2000 620 25817 16663 43100 21 1697 838 2556 
2001 402 28215 16698 45315 20 1638 909 2567 
2002 441 29127 17697 47265 16 1830 833 2679 
2003 1003 28043 17446 46492 49 1940 888 2877 
2004 1459 29195 19895 50549 70 1939 962 2971 
2005 1997 29140 22638 53775 90 1952 952 2994 
2006 2092 27311 20203 49606 111 1911 1011 3033 
2007 2134 27151 20934 50219 91 1916 1054 3061 
2008 1918 26255 21304 49477 115 1820 1097 3032 
2009 1796 26096 21430 49322 111 2079 1385 3575 
2010 1674 29490 24320 55484 103 2095 1338 3536 
 
Source: Comissão Permanente para os Vestibulares (COMVEST). ‘Perfil socioeconômico’, 
http://www.comvest.unicamp.br/estatisticas/perfil/perfil.html 
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Table 22. 1987-1998 Subscribers, Year First Entered the Exam 
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Blank 135 1099 722 515 332 345 329 475 607 692 545 567 
The current vestibular 5588 10383 11764 14298 14093 13939 13304 18134 15707 12910 12778 13317 
1 Year ago 3410 10573 8931 11077 11622 12226 10717 12810 11684 9292 9219 9321 
2 Year ago 1521 4961 4673 4675 4647 5453 5041 5910 6077 4990 4317 4768 
3 Year ago 1087 2487 2530 2634 2487 2813 2740 3227 3388 2910 2549 2637 
4 Year ago 580 1118 955 1042 997 1110 1080 1458 1383 1193 1078 1072 
5 Year ago 342 585 440 461 441 520 509 624 673 507 454 508 
6 Year ago 183 342 271 256 237 293 336 326 326 293 251 267 
7 Year ago 147 258 194 199 173 231 185 305 244 235 210 218 
More than 7 Years Ago 267 586 452 515 539 692 594 756 649 488 550 652 
Total 13260 32392 30932 35672 35568 37622 34835 44025 40738 33510 31951 33327 
 
Source: Comissão Permanente para os Vestibulares (COMVEST). ‘Perfil socioeconômico’, http://www.comvest.unicamp.br/estatisticas/perfil/perfil.html 
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Table 23. 1987-1998 Subscribers Enrolled, Year First Entered the Exam 
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Blank 7 38 27 12 19 12 14 18 17 32 20 33 
The current vestibular 271 327 375 456 426 449 514 500 491 445 495 625 
1 Year ago 436 521 441 529 599 634 653 650 612 558 580 711 
2 Year ago 233 233 252 233 258 292 268 348 326 292 287 325 
3 Year ago 136 137 136 114 140 144 168 157 184 159 160 193 
4 Year ago 66 72 62 59 57 84 99 71 84 101 78 86 
5 Year ago 39 37 39 37 30 47 45 37 45 40 52 43 
6 Year ago 15 37 23 20 15 21 39 27 29 34 29 25 
7 Year ago 13 14 14 20 10 30 25 29 21 33 22 31 
More than 7 Years Ago 32 88 59 57 58 87 107 95 85 77 66 128 
Total 1248 1504 1428 1537 1612 1800 1932 1932 1894 1771 1789 2200 
 
Source: Comissão Permanente para os Vestibulares (COMVEST). ‘Perfil socioeconômico’, http://www.comvest.unicamp.br/estatisticas/perfil/perfil.html 
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Table 24. 1987-2010 Subscribers Total Monthly Income of Family (In Minimum Salary) 
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Blank 166 1185 785 671 681 643 795 n.a. n.a. 1422 1035 774 
Up to 1 ms 60 77 188 195 171 153 262 n.a. n.a. 102 104 180 
1Sa of the 3sm 408 433 781 961 708 861 2054 n.a. n.a. 498 472 622 
Of the 3sm 5sm 1131 1308 1678 2244 1775 2566 4185 n.a. n.a. 1449 1322 1528 
Of the 5sm 10SM 2741 4580 5646 5679 5040 6805 8045 n.a. n.a. 4219 4495 4798 
10SM of the 15sm 2793 5489 5659 6739 5865 6705 6406 n.a. n.a. 5046 4401 4856 
From 15sm to 20sm 2097 4942 5058 5414 5925 6285 4361 n.a. n.a. 4800 4637 4530 
20sm of the 30SM 1932 6089 4532 5830 5775 5558 4128 n.a. n.a. 5428 4971 4967 
30SM 40SM of the 1024 3660 3486 3553 4130 3615 2415 n.a. n.a. 3907 3843 3923 
Above 40SM 908 4629 3119 4386 5498 4431 2184 n.a. n.a. 6639 6671 7149 
Total 13260 32392 30932 35672 35568 37622 34835 n.a. n.a. 33510 31951 33327 
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Table 24. Continued 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Blank 660 727 493 516 611 1365 4087 3132 3204 3140 2882 3242 
Up to 1 ms 136 164 192 239 316 582 482 465 640 477 395 388 
1Sa of the 3sm 560 1121 1297 2165 2845 4215 4344 4974 6262 6090 5804 6391 
Of the 3sm 5sm 1820 2860 3152 4704 6348 7780 7667 8885 7373 7258 8051 8501 
Of the 5sm 10SM 6008 7848 9400 9882 11356 11189 13842 13944 14147 13045 12565 14554 
10SM of the 15sm 5579 6962 7222 7138 7560 7692 6924 5183 8016 8279 8190 8791 
From 15sm to 20sm 5130 4926 6199 6373 5358 5850 7389 6019 3770 3683 3751 4909 
20sm of the 30SM 5935 7538 6517 7862 5883 6611 4010 3377 4541 4609 4503 4905 
30SM 40SM of the 5491 4200 5128 4231 2981 2529 3274 2233 686 1601 1467 1788 
Above 40SM 6827 6754 5715 4155 3234 2736 1756 1394 1580 1295 1714 2015 
Total 38146 43100 45315 47265 46492 50549 53775 49606 50219 49477 49322 55484 
 
Note: N.a. if no data available. 
Source: Comissão Permanente para os Vestibulares (COMVEST). ‘Perfil socioeconômico’, http://www.comvest.unicamp.br/estatisticas/perfil/perfil.html 
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Table 25. 1987-2010 Subscribers Enrolled, Total Monthly Income of Family (In Minimum Salary) 
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Blank 8 44 34 25 36 23 41 n.a. n.a. 63 49 49 
Up to 1 ms 6 2 8 9 6 11 14 n.a. n.a. 7 3 5 
1Sa of the 3sm 23 15 21 35 28 39 109 n.a. n.a. 20 21 41 
Of the 3sm 5sm 75 58 77 79 58 113 256 n.a. n.a. 106 58 104 
Of the 5sm 10SM 205 191 239 236 218 313 462 n.a. n.a. 222 258 352 
10SM of the 15sm 257 212 252 277 251 304 340 n.a. n.a. 290 259 318 
From 15sm to 20sm 204 182 228 216 270 303 220 n.a. n.a. 262 255 310 
20sm of the 30SM 222 300 208 271 277 279 239 n.a. n.a. 291 300 318 
30SM 40SM of the 134 208 183 170 207 193 135 n.a. n.a. 219 234 262 
Above 40SM 114 292 178 219 261 222 116 n.a. n.a. 291 352 441 
Total 1248 1504 1428 1537 1612 1800 1932 n.a. n.a. 1771 1789 2200 
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Table 25. Continued 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Blank 39 27 19 20 28 60 185 182 170 188 203 172 
Up to 1 ms 11 11 7 13 14 31 15 21 16 14 19 21 
1Sa of the 3sm 40 53 61 92 131 147 160 200 257 258 313 364 
Of the 3sm 5sm 125 128 149 234 344 370 368 487 422 443 606 559 
Of the 5sm 10SM 374 517 516 588 704 722 813 928 1034 894 1008 1022 
10SM of the 15sm 374 420 408 419 508 475 444 382 555 565 586 571 
From 15sm to 20sm 342 309 403 399 361 403 478 370 228 225 310 324 
20sm of the 30SM 395 502 401 469 393 437 250 247 258 281 327 301 
30SM 40SM of the 337 249 304 241 207 161 183 135 50 88 93 104 
Above 40SM 358 340 299 204 187 165 98 81 71 76 110 98 
Total 2395 2556 2567 2679 2877 2971 2994 3033 3061 3032 3575 3536 
 
Note: N.a. if no data available. 
Source: Comissão Permanente para os Vestibulares (COMVEST). ‘Perfil socioeconômico’, http://www.comvest.unicamp.br/estatisticas/perfil/perfil.html 
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Table 26. 1987-2010 Subscribers Occupation of Father 
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Blank 175 1194 827 603 504 531 704 1242 1537 1421 1255 1210 
Senior political and 
administrative, owners of large 
companies 
259 750 799 852 762 768 633 806 873 774 675 753 
Professionals, management and 
direction, owners of medium-
sized enterprises 
4521 11923 12476 14034 14418 14925 14403 16858 16581 14383 13713 14082 
Pos. lower supervision. or 
inspected. of occupation. non-
manual, props. peqs. companies 
3689 9149 8252 10260 9917 10167 9269 11610 11117 8782 8290 8522 
Routine non-manual occupations 1625 3401 3366 3986 3792 4281 3562 5231 3925 2969 3031 3303 
Supervision of manual work 1128 2126 1917 2173 2140 2458 2131 2742 2267 1745 1523 1629 
Specialized manual occupations 1494 3197 2806 3151 3340 3701 3405 4407 3476 2717 2730 2978 
Unskilled manual occupations 369 652 489 613 695 791 728 1129 962 719 734 850 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 13260 32392 30932 35672 35568 37622 34835 44025 40738 33510 31951 33327 
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Table 26. Continued 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Blank 1045 1387 1404 1463 1663 2727 3502 3350 3494 3151 2802 2923 
Senior political and 
administrative, owners of large 
companies 
729 851 748 800 820 1493 1874 1462 1511 1247 1380 1540 
Professionals, management and 
direction, owners of medium-
sized enterprises 
16414 16860 17837 18075 19871 20829 20853 19637 20793 20176 21374 23824 
Pos. lower supervision. or 
inspected. of occupation. non-
manual, props. peqs. companies 
9195 11223 11830 12254 10605 9833 8756 8130 7930 7726 7838 9138 
Routine non-manual occupations 4184 4435 4687 5070 4227 4701 5005 4687 4806 4795 4662 5318 
Supervision of manual work 1837 2115 2248 2288 1687 1320 1333 1166 1134 1131 1067 1206 
Specialized manual occupations 3679 4347 4694 5040 4917 4388 4858 4361 3989 4083 3638 4137 
Unskilled manual occupations 1063 1360 1276 1553 1985 1909 2409 2101 2168 2022 1753 1932 
Other 0 522 591 722 717 3349 5185 4712 4394 5146 4808 5466 
Total 38146 43100 45315 47265 46492 50549 53775 49606 50219 49477 49322 55484 
Note: N.a. if no data available. The Category of other has included small categories that have changes in the questionnaire over time.  
Source: Comissão Permanente para os Vestibulares (COMVEST). ‘Perfil socioeconômico’, 
http://www.comvest.unicamp.br/estatisticas/perfil/perfil.html 
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Table 27. 1987-2010 Subscribers Enrolled, Occupation of Father 
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Blank 7 40 32 14 19 14 33 50 52 74 53 79 
Senior political and 
administrative, owners of large 
companies 
30 41 45 35 38 38 36 16 34 33 31 39 
Professionals, management and 
direction, owners of medium-
sized enterprises 
556 585 625 717 698 762 786 821 765 701 783 929 
Pos. lower supervision. or 
inspected. of occupation. non-
manual, props. peqs. companies 
325 416 369 393 410 504 493 509 549 460 455 548 
Routine non-manual occupations 153 167 140 172 186 193 188 212 193 186 206 233 
Supervision of manual work 63 86 53 61 89 94 145 103 95 89 75 104 
Specialized manual occupations 96 132 134 119 148 161 211 179 167 192 152 217 
Unskilled manual occupations 18 37 30 26 24 34 40 42 39 36 34 51 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 1248 1504 1428 1537 1612 1800 1932 1932 1894 1771 1789 2200 
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Table 27. Continued 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Blank 49 65 58 93 121 145 197 181 186 215 186 49 
Senior political and 
administrative, owners of large 
companies 
35 27 37 34 88 93 54 77 53 81 63 35 
Professionals, management and 
direction, owners of medium-
sized enterprises 
976 1020 1043 1282 1349 1290 1286 1323 1261 1584 1487 976 
Pos. lower supervision. or 
inspected. of occupation. non-
manual, props. peqs. companies 
722 734 779 665 623 523 567 504 513 601 586 722 
Routine non-manual occupations 295 277 278 295 268 278 278 346 331 329 393 295 
Supervision of manual work 127 117 119 86 71 64 78 65 64 66 91 127 
Specialized manual occupations 260 250 257 295 203 249 219 224 221 260 259 260 
Unskilled manual occupations 65 50 71 89 80 96 107 100 107 103 116 65 
Other 27 27 37 2915 168 256 247 241 296 336 355 27 
Total 2556 2567 2679 2877 2971 2994 3033 3061 3032 3575 3536 2556 
Note: N.a. if no data available. The Category of other has included small categories that have changes in the questionnaire over time.  
Source: Comissão Permanente para os Vestibulares (COMVEST). ‘Perfil socioeconômico’, 
http://www.comvest.unicamp.br/estatisticas/perfil/perfil.html 
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Table 28. 1987-2010 Subscribers Father’s Level of Education 
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Blank 123 1035 666 348 375 382 428 666 838 866 698 647 
Not attended school 151 343 246 351 306 345 286 383 284 213 203 257 
First to fourth year of a degree 
(elementary education) 
incomplete 
1428 2598 2151 2467 2374 2636 2273 2773 2287 1648 1497 1643 
First to fourth year of a degree 
(elementary education) 
completed 
2238 4470 3943 4367 4365 4534 3980 4796 3762 2540 2389 2315 
Fifth to eighth grade in a school 
(elementary school) incomplete 874 2013 1784 2136 2114 2163 1966 2390 1912 1516 1392 1495 
Fifth to eighth grade in a school 
(elementary school) completed 1005 2363 2215 2761 2464 2573 2118 2830 2419 1770 1679 1765 
First through third grades of the 
second degree (high school) 
incomplete 
539 1272 1219 1441 1383 1527 1283 1792 1649 1296 1175 1160 
First through third grades of the 
second degree (high school) 
completed 
1895 4697 4571 5254 5203 5133 4717 6165 5938 4705 4427 4663 
Incomplete higher or more 694 1918 1937 2161 2227 2394 2361 2970 2971 2502 2481 2784 
Complete higher or more 4313 11683 12200 14386 14757 15935 15423 19260 18678 16454 16010 16598 
Total 13260 32392 30932 35672 35568 37622 34835 44025 40738 33510 31951 33327 
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Table 28. Continued 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Blank 590 815 711 765 842 2168 2936 2991 3020 2781 2462 2502 
Not attended school 211 381 340 352 411 503 826 564 483 407 336 335 
First to fourth year of a degree 
(elementary education) 
incomplete 
1824 2313 2522 2551 2418 3221 3796 3148 2695 2398 2056 2110 
First to fourth year of a degree 
(elementary education) 
completed 
2621 3131 2986 2921 2840 2537 2551 2080 1698 1581 1331 1311 
Fifth to eighth grade in a school 
(elementary school) incomplete 1725 1932 2127 2200 2194 2157 2263 1962 2031 2277 2027 2207 
Fifth to eighth grade in a school 
(elementary school) completed 1823 2124 2167 2287 2297 2339 2351 2096 2009 1760 1596 1730 
First through third grades of the 
second degree (high school) 
incomplete 
1506 1781 1856 2058 1900 1957 1844 1749 1733 1774 1803 2029 
First through third grades of the 
second degree (high school) 
completed 
5568 6351 6985 7656 7843 8637 9409 8923 8928 9374 9499 11172 
Incomplete higher or more 3409 3859 4261 4627 4696 4872 5538 5198 5369 4834 4994 5337 
Complete higher or more 18869 20413 21360 21848 21051 22158 22261 20895 22253 22291 23218 26751 
Total 38146 43100 45315 47265 46492 50549 53775 49606 50219 49477 49322 55484 
Note: N.a. if no data available. 
Source: Comissão Permanente para os Vestibulares (COMVEST). ‘Perfil socioeconômico’, http://www.comvest.unicamp.br/estatisticas/perfil/perfil.html 
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Table 29. 1987-2010 Subscribers Enrolled, Father’s Level of Education 
 1987 1988 
1989 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Blank 5 36 
24 
8 13 14 17 23 30 46 30 40 
Not attended school 4 13 
13 
17 15 12 14 7 11 10 6 17 
First to fourth year of a degree 
(elementary education) 
incomplete 
83 118 
98 
68 105 117 139 112 92 83 78 96 
First to fourth year of a degree 
(elementary education) 
completed 
124 187 
164 
149 156 164 218 188 173 161 124 154 
Fifth to eighth grade in a school 
(elementary school) incomplete 62 83 
76 
74 73 90 108 100 69 74 80 95 
Fifth to eighth grade in a school 
(elementary school) completed 91 92 
86 
99 92 105 113 101 110 100 64 131 
First through third grades of the 
second degree (high school) 
incomplete 
41 50 
53 
45 49 54 68 60 71 66 58 64 
First through third grades of the 
second degree (high school) 
completed 
203 199 
194 
223 236 239 267 260 267 254 250 293 
Incomplete higher or more 67 107 
78 
93 98 128 100 148 156 127 147 162 
Complete higher or more 568 619 
642 
761 775 877 888 933 915 850 952 1148 
Total 1248 1504 
1428 
1537 1612 1800 1932 1932 1894 1771 1789 2200 
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Table 29. Continued 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Blank 34 30 39 31 37 97 127 170 156 176 186 161 
Not attended school 13 14 14 12 17 19 20 19 13 21 15 19 
First to fourth year of a degree 
(elementary education) 
incomplete 
130 118 132 108 126 136 171 149 146 119 112 124 
First to fourth year of a degree 
(elementary education) 
completed 
160 179 136 167 152 106 145 103 82 83 106 73 
Fifth to eighth grade in a school 
(elementary school) incomplete 109 109 113 110 120 99 113 103 114 119 122 130 
Fifth to eighth grade in a school 
(elementary school) completed 108 117 112 123 125 118 119 93 116 119 116 113 
First through third grades of the 
second degree (high school) 
incomplete 
103 113 113 109 102 104 93 99 97 85 111 124 
First through third grades of the 
second degree (high school) 
completed 
327 380 366 414 479 504 501 552 533 563 683 728 
Incomplete higher or more 205 268 258 267 328 322 333 320 360 334 388 367 
Complete higher or more 1206 1228 1284 1338 1391 1466 1372 1425 1444 1413 1736 1697 
Total 2395 2556 2567 2679 2877 2971 2994 3033 3061 3032 3575 3536 
Note: N.a. if no data available. 
Source: Comissão Permanente para os Vestibulares (COMVEST). ‘Perfil socioeconômico’, http://www.comvest.unicamp.br/estatisticas/perfil/perfil.html 
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